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"Laws are silent in the time of war." 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, 106 B.c. - 43 B.C. 
I. Introduction 
The world has come a long way from Ancient Rome, but today, the proposition still 
lingers. When does the interest of national security trump environmental laws? When can a 
federal agency such as a branch of the armed forces say, "yes, we agree that protection of the 
environment is important, but what we have to do right now is more important"? How urgent is 
urgent? Or more basically, when is an emergency, an "emergency"? 
In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 was enacted to "encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and 
welfare of man; [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation .... ,,2 NEPA is essentially a procedural mechanism to force federal 
agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. 
There are no exceptions in the Act. The regulations implementing NEP A, however, do 
have an emergency exception. Section 1506.11 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
states: 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with 
significant environmental impact without observing the provisions in these 
regulations, the Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council 
[on Environmental Quality] about alternate arrangements. Agencies and the 
Council willlirnit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the 
immediate impacts of the emergency. 
I 42 U.S.c. § 4321 ef seq. (2009). 
242 U.s.c. § 4321. 
While this exception has not been used very often,} it was central to the U.S. Navy's 
position in the case of Winter v. NRDC. 4 In that case, the U.S. Navy, after consulting with the 
Council on Environmental Quality [CEQ] and getting their approval, claimed the emergency 
exception as to why the Navy did not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before 
conducting a series of training exercises in the Pacific Ocean off the Southern California coast. 
These exercises use mid-frequency active sonar, which the President of the United States has 
determined that the use of which is "essential to national security.") The Natural Resources 
Defense Council, along with various other groups, claims that mid-frequency active sonar harms 
marine animals, and an EIS was required. They filed for and were granted a preliminary 
injunction by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which was affirmed by 
the Ninth Circuit.6 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, and vacated the preliminary 
injunction to the extent of the Navy's challenge of certain of its provisions. The majority of the 
Court did not, however, reach an opinion as to the validity of the Navy's use of the emergency 
exception under 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11, leaving the question unanswered. 
This paper will explore the emergency exception to NEPA under 40 C.P.R. § 1506.11, by 
looking at what situations it has been used in, determining that it was properly invoked by the 
government in NRDC v. Winter, and hypothesizing as to its usefulness to the U.S. Navy in 
similar situations. 
3 It has been requested of CEQ only 41 times. See U.S. Congressional Research Service. Environmental Exemptions 
for the Navy's Mid-Frequency Active Sonar Training Program (RL 34403: Aug. 27, 2008), by Kristina Alexander 
[hereinafter CRS ReportJ . 
.j 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). For simplicity, while the case was NRDC v. Winter in the lower courts, when the Navy 
petitioned for certiorari, it was renamed Winter v. NRDC, and will henceforth be referred to as such. 
5 Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Navy Granted Authority To Use Sonar In Training Off California 
(Jan. 16,2008) (on file with author). 
6 51 8 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming 530 F. Supp. 2d I I 10 (CD. Cal. 2008». 
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II. The National Environmental Policy Act 
A. Purpose/History 
The National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] was enacted in 1970, and was one of 
the first modem federal environmental statutes. It established environmental policies and goals, 
and created the President's Council on Environmental Quality [CEQ]. Rather than a regulatory 
statute, it is an informational one, requiring the federal government to prepare and make public 
information about the environmental effects of certain actions it is going to take, and propose 
alternatives to such actions. The thought is that a better-informed decision-maker will improve 
the quality of its final decisions, and that a better-informed public will keep the process honest. 
There was opposition by many members of Congress to NEP A, and they intended to 
limit NEP A compliance, but the drafters sought to ensure that NEP A would have uniform 
application.7 By delegating enforcement to the Executive Branch (through the CEQ) and the 
Judiciary Branch (through judicial review), the drafters hoped that the structure of the Act would 
block efforts to avoid NEPA' s requirements.8 
When enacted, the only similar precedent existing federal legislation was the Full 
Employment Act of 1946, which declared a historic national policy on the management of the 
economy, and established the Council of Economic Advisers. 9 Senator Henry Jackson hoped 
that NEPA would provide "an equally important national policy for the management of 
America's future environment."IO " ... [I]t is my view that S. 1075 as passed by the Senate and 
now, as agreed upon by the conference committee, is the most important and far-reaching 
7 Aaron Ehrlich, In Hidden Places: Congressional Legislation That Limits the Scope of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENY. L. & POL'y 285, 285 (2007). 
8 / d. at 285 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 91-379 at 2754). 
9 115 CONGo REC. 40415, 40416 (1960) (Mf. Jackson). 
IOld. 
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environmental and conservation measure ever enacted by Congress."ll Senator Jackson viewed 
NEP A has Congress' declaration that the federal government will not intentionally initiate 
actions which will do irreparable harm to the land, air, and water that support all life on Earth. 12 
However, he also did not see NEP A as the total solution for the environmental problems 
plaguing the country at the time. "While the National Environmental Policy Act is 1969 is not a 
panacea, it is a starting point.,,13 So impoltant did Senator Jackson and the other drafters of the 
original Senate bill view the environment, the first draft of S 1075 used the phrase "each person 
has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment" in its declaration of policy. 
That language did not survive the conference committee, however, and was changed to the 
current language of "each person should enjoy and healthful environment.,,14 Senator Jackson 
was clear that if there are departures from the standard of excellence that the Act has as a goal, 
they should be exceptions, not the rule, and as exceptions, they must be justified in the light of 
public scrutiny. 15 
Another big proponent of NEP A was Senator Allott. As he put it, by enacting NEP A, 
" ... Congress is not giving the American people something, rather the Congress is responding to 
the demands of the American people.,,16 "In this case, government response cannot be too soon. 
We can only hope that it is not too late."l7 He also recognized that the environment and how we 
dealt with it does not fall on a single governmental agency, and that NEPA recognizes that fact, 
which gives it its strength, appropriateness, and timeliness. IS 
Il/d. 
12 Id. at 40416. 
131d. at 40417. 
14 1d. at 40416. 
151d. 
16 Id. at 40422. 
17/d. at 40422. 
18 Id. at 40423. 
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Senator Allott described the background of NEP A and its creation of the CEQ in his 
comments to the conference committee. 
The concept of a high-level council on conservation, natural resources, and 
environment has had congressional expression for nearly a decade .... It first 
found legislative support from a former Chairman of the Senate Interior 
Committee, the late Senator Murray. In the 86th Congress, he introduced S. 2549, 
the Resources and Conservation Act, which would have established a high-level 
council of environmental advisors along with the first expression of a 
comprehensive environmental policy. Bills of similar purpose were also 
introduced in the 89th and 90th Congress. 19 
During the 91 st Congress, three bills dealing with environmental policy and creation of new 
overview institutions were introduced and referred to the Senate Interior Committee, and these 
became S. 1075.20 During this time, President Nixon had expressed concern over the 
degradation of the nation's environment, and had committed himself during his 1968 campaign 
to a policy of improving the environment. In a radio address he gave on October 18, 1968, he 
said, "the battle for the quality of the American environment is a battle against neglect, 
mismanagement, poor planning and a piecemeal approach to problems of natural resources.,,21 It 
was against this backdrop that NEP A and the CEQ were created. 
B. Policies 
Section 4331 of NEPA outlines very broad national policies regarding the protection of 
the environment. The section states that it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use "all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy" to improve and coordinate plans and programs, and lists six general goals, as 
191d. at 40422. 
20 ld. at 40422. 
21 ld. at 40422 (citing President Richard Nixon radio address, October 18, 1968, "A Strategy of 
Quality: Conservation in the Seventies"). 
5 
generic as "attain[ing] the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences."n 
The key section to NEPA is Section 4332, which directs federal agency action. To the 
"fullest extent possible," all federal agencies must include in their proposals for major federal 
actions that significantly affect the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement 
concerning the environmental impact.23 These detailed statements must include any adverse 
environmental impacts that cannot be avoided, alternatives to the proposed action, analysis on 
the relationship between short-term uses and maintenance and the enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and any irreversible commitment of resources. 24 Prior to doing an environmental 
statement, the federal agency must consult with and get comments from any other federal agency 
that has jurisdiction or special expertise in any environmental impact involved. Copies of these 
comments are to go to the President, the CEQ, and the public. 25 
C. Council on Environmental Quality 
Section 4342 of NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality [CEQ], as an 
advisor to the President on environmental issues. The CEQ was to be composed of three 
members who are appointed by the President by and with advice and consent of the Senate, and 
the President was to appoint one of the members as the Chairman.26 Each member was to be 
"exceptionally well qualified" by way of his training, experience, and attainments, to analyze and 
2242 U.s.c. § 4331 (b). The other five goals are: "( I) fulfill[ingJ the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of 
the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assur[ing) for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and 
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; ... (4) preserv[ing) important historic, cultural and natural aspects 
of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of 
individual choice; (5) acheiv[ing) a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards 
of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and (6) enhanc[ingJ the quality of renewable resources and approach 
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources." 
23 § 4332( c). 
24 § 4332(c). 
25 § 4332(c). 
26 § 4342. 
6 
interpret environmental information and trends, to appraise programs and activities of the federal 
government in light of NEP A's established policies, to be conscious of and responsive to the 
scientific, economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and interest of the country, and to 
formulate and recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the 
en vironmen t. 27 
However, in 2005, Public Law 109-54 reduced the number of members to just one, who 
serves as the Chairman.28 The Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970 provided 
additional responsibilities to the CEQ, in addition to the duties and functions spelled out in 
Section 4344 ofNEPA. 29 According to CEQ's official website, their mission is to coordinate 
federal environmental efforts, and work closely with agencies and other White House offices in 
the development of environmental policies and initiatives. 3o The CEQ reports annually to the 
President on the state of the environment, overseas federal agency implementation of the EIS 
process, and acts as a referee when agencies cannot agree on the adequacy of EIS' S. 31 The 
Chairman serves as the principal environmental advisor to the President.32 
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 11,991 directing CEQ to publish 
new regulations. 33 This was in response to inconsistent application of NEP A's requirements by 
27 § 4342. 
28 § 4342. 
29 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/administrationJeoplceq/. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Nancy Sutley is President Obama's appointment as CEQ Chairman. Prior to the appointment, she was the Deputy 
Mayor for Energy and Environment for Los Angeles, and she holds a BA from Cornell and a Masters in Public 
Policy from Harvard. Id. 
333 c.F.R. § 123 (1978). 
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federal agencies in the early 1970' s. 34 In 1978, CEQ issued regulations that forced compliance 
with the procedures of NEPA and encouraged uniformity in the preparation of EIS' S. 35 
D. Process 
The main tool in the NEPA process is an "environmental impact statement" [EIS], 
which is a very detailed report on the environmental impacts, positive and negative, and the 
alternatives to the proposed action. All federal agencies are required to go through this process 
whenever they propose any major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment. 36 Courts have construed the term "major" in a number of different ways.37 The 
CEQ regulations construe it together with "significantly,,,38 and say that if a proposed action has 
a significant environmental effect, it is subject to NEP A regardless of whether it is otherwise 
major or minor. This essentially eliminates the word "major" from NEP A. 39 The regulations 
state that "major/significantly affecting" does not have precise criteria, but should be considered 
b b · 40 on a case- y-case aSlS. 
"Federal action" includes not only actions by the federal government, but also federal 
authorization of actions by private parties and some federally funded activities.41 "Actions" can 
34 Robert Orsi, Comment: Emergency Exceptions From NEPA: Who Should Decide '!, 14 B.C ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 
481, 483 (1987). 
351d. See also 40 CF.R. § IS00 et seq. (2009). 
36 42 U.S.C § 4332(C). 
37 1_1 ENVTLLAWPRACTICEGUIDE § 1.04[2][a]. 
38 "Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly" 40 CF.R. § IS08.18. 
39 1-1 ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[2][a]. A second approach construes '"major" as a modifier of "federal," 
which has the effect of placing actions that are marginally federal outside of NEPA's scope. See District of 
Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C Cir. 1980). A third approach construes "major" independently from 
either "significantly" or "federal." See Minn. Pesticide Info. & Educ. Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 442, 443 (8th Cir. 1994). 
This approach requires a finding that a proposed action is both major and significant, but no court has ever found 
that an action with a significant effect is not subject to NEPA because it is minor. See Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 9S9 F.2d S08, SI3-14 (4th Cir. 1992); Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1295-96 (8th 
Cir. 1990), NAACP v. Med. Center, Inc., S84 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1978). 
40 40 CF.R. §§ IS08.27, IS08.3, 1508.8. 
41 40 CF.R. § IS02.4. 
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be one of three types: 1) proposals sufficiently concrete and definite;42 2) inactions;43 or 3) 
proposals for legislation by federal agencies.44 Lastly, "human environment" includes the 
natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment. It does 
not include solely economic or social effects.45 
1. Environmental Impact Statements 
Section 1502.3 of the CEQ regulations layout the statutory requirement of EIS' s. 
The EIS process can be boiled down to four basic parts: 
1. Identify whether an EIS is required; 
2. Prepare a draft EIS and offer it to the public for comment; 
3. Prepare a final EIS; and 
4. Issue the Record of Decision. 
If an EIS is going to be necessary, the federal agency publishes a "notice of intent" that it 
is going to prepare one, and then the agency goes through the "scoping" process. Scoping 
identifies the coverage of the EIS and significant issues that will be addressed.46 To determine 
the scope of an EIS, the agency must consider three types of actions,47 three types of 
altematives,48 and three types of impacts.49 The agency must invite the participation of affected 
Federal, State, and local agencies, any affected Indian tribe, the proponent of the action, and 
other interested persons (including those who might oppose the action on environmental 
grounds), unless there is a limited exception under section 1507.3(c). The agency should also 
42 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) . 
./3 CEQ regulations include "failure to act," but see Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), which said no . 
./4 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23. 
45 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 . 
./640 C.F.R. § 1508.25. 
47 Connected, cumulative, and similar. Id. 
48 No action alternative, other reasonable courses of action, and mitigation measures not in the proposed action. Id. 
49 Direct, indirect, and cumulative. Id. 
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hold early scoping meetings which may be integrated with any other early planning meeting the 
agency has. An agency shall revise the determinations made if substantial changes are made 
later in the proposed action, or if significant new circumstances or information arise which bear 
h I " 50 on t e proposa or Its Impacts.' 
Once scoping is complete, the agency does a draft EIS, which is a full analysis of the 
project, including a description of the proposed action, discussion of alternatives, including 
actions to mitigate any adverse effects, and discussion of the environmental consequences of the 
actions and alternatives. 51 This draft is then made available to the public, as well as other 
agencies for their input. The agency has the discretion as to whether to hold public meetings. 
Any comments made by the public and other agencies become part of the administrative 
record. 52 
The agency must respond to any comments in its final EIS, and may modify the EIS in 
order to reflect comments. It can, but is not required to, resubmit the EIS for public comment 
after modification. A "record of decision" is then issued, stating what the final decision was, 
identifying all alternatives considered by the agency in reaching that decision (specifying the 
alternatives which were considered to be environmentally preferable53), and stating whether all 
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the alternative selected have 
been adopted, and if not, why not.54 
As far as time limits for the entire NEP A process, CEQ decided not to set a specific 
limitation, but the regulations encourage federal agencies to set specific time lines for individual 
50 40 c.F.R. § 1501.7. 
51 40 c.F.R. § 1502.9. 
52 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.19, 15m. 
S3 An agency may discuss preferences among alternatives based on relevant factors including economic and 
technical considerations and agency statutory missions. An agency shall identify and discuss all such factors 
including any essential considerations of national policy which were balanced by the agency in making its decision 
and state how those considerations entered into its decision. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2. 
54 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2. 
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actions, and set out factors for consideration. The regulations also encourage agencies to 
designate a specific person to expedite the NEP A process. 55 Section 1506.10 does specify that 
no decision on the proposed action can be made by the agency until 90 days from the publishing 
of the draft EIS has passed, or 30 days from the final EIS. However, if the final EIS is filed 
within the 90-day window after the draft EIS was published, the times run concurrently, but at 
least 45 days must be allowed for public comment on the draft. 56 
2. Environmental AssessmentslFindings of No Significant Impact 
If the proposed action is not exempt from the EIS requirement, the agency must 
determine whether it meets the EIS threshold, and a common way to do that is to prepare an 
"environmental assessment" (EA). This is a concise document, which includes brief discussions 
of the need for the proposal, of alternatives, of the environmental impacts of the proposed action 
and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted. Its purpose is to briefly provide 
enough evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS or to make a finding of 
no significant impact, aid an agency's compliance with NEPA when no EIS is necessary, and 
facilitate preparation of an EIS when one is necessary. 57 If an agency knows from the beginning 
that an EIS will be necessary, it need not prepare an EA as well. 
A "finding of no significant impact," or FONSI, is a document by a Federal agency 
briefly stating why an action, not otherwise excluded, will not have a significant effect on the 
human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement will not be prepared. It 
must include the environmental assessment or a summary of it and note any other environmental 
documents related to it.58 FONSI's must be made available to the public. 59 
5540C.F.R.§ 1501.8. 
56 40 c.F.R. § 1506. 10. 
57 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1501.3. 
58 40 c.F.R. §§ 1508.13, 1501.7(a)(5). 
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3. Judicial Review 
NEPA does not have a citizen suit provision, nor authorize civil penalties against 
agencies that fail to comply with its provisions. The judicial avenue for the public is therefore 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, Sections 703 and 704, with the remedy being injunctive 
relief. The APA provides judicial review of final agency actions for which there is no adequate 
remedy in a court. Courts can review both the decision not to do an EIS, and whether an EIS 
was done in compliance with NEP A. The standard of review is whether agency action or 
inaction was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law. 6o 
E. ExemptionslExceptions 
Some environmental statutes actually originated in disasters. 61 The Torrey Canyon oil 
tanker spill in 1967, and the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill in 1968, helped the push for the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, which in turn required the newly-created EPA to 
promulgate the National Oil and Hazardous Materials Contingency Plan.62 The 1973 crash of a 
cargo jet loaded with hazardous materials at Logan International Airport in Boston led to the 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975.63 The Toxic Substances Control Act and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 were due to the exposure of factory workers 
in Virginia to the chemical Kepone.64 While the most notorious example is the 1978 Love Canal 
incident in Niagara Falls, New York, which inspired the Comprehensive Environmental 
59 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.6. 
60 5 U.s.c. § 706(2)(A) (2009). 
61 Michael B. Gerrard, Emergency Exemptions From Environmental Laws After Disasters, 20 





Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,65 the most terrible disaster was the 1984 release of 
mythl isocyanate at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopol, India, which killed several thousand 
people. This, plus the chemical release in West Virginia, that fortunately did not result in any 
deaths, led to the Emergency Planning and Community Rights-to-Know Act of 1986, requiring 
state and local emergency planning, as well as the compilation and disclosure of extensive 
information about chemical usage.66 Most recently, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989 
lead to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.67 
That being said, some have urged Congress to adopt emergency exemptions so that 
environmental laws do not interfere with rescue and recovery efforts.68 However, recent 
disasters such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have shown that perhaps that is not the way to go. 
After 9111, some of the demolition, transport, and disposals operations that took place may have 
violated a variety of environmental laws. For a large demolition project, there should have been 
preparation of an EIS or EA, advance notice of asbestos removal, source separation, and many 
other procedures, none of which were followed. 69 And no one said a thing -- no environmental 
agency or advocacy group.70 
There is a New York law that gives the governor the right to temporarily suspend part of 
any state or local laws during a state disaster. 71 New York's State Environmental Quality 






emergency actions that are immediately necessary on a limited and temporary 
basis for the protection or preservation of life, health, property or natural 
resources, provided that such actions are directly related to the emergency and are 
701d. at II. 
71 ld. at II. See NY CLS Exec § 29-a (2009). 
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performed to cause the least change or disturbance, practicable under the 
circumstance, to the environment.72 
The state courts have interpreted this provision broadly to include events such as prison 
overcrowding and homelessness.73 
On the federal side, when the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) declared 
on September 11, 2001 that New York City was a disaster area, certain exemptions from federal 
environmental laws were triggered. 74 Most notably, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act,75 the federal emergency response was mostly exempted from 
NEP A.76 Most of the exemptions are specifically for disaster relief, but the Act also allows for 
NEP A exemption for emergency relief. To that end, Section 102 of the Act defines "emergency" 
as 
any occasion or instances for which, in the determination of the President, Federal 
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save 
lives and to protect property and public health and safeti" or to lessen or avert the 
threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.7 
The existence of the Stafford Act and its nullification of NEP A requirements for federal actions 
call into question the need and purpose behind section 1506.11. However, Stafford is for disaster 
emergencies, which is a subset of "emergencies," which supports the Navy's use of 40 C.F.R. § 
1506.11 in the Winter v. NRDC case. 78 
Similarly, with respect to Hurricane Katrina, even before landfall, the governors of 
Louisiana and Mississippi both declared a state of emergency.79 On August 29th, 2005, the day 
72 Gerrard, supra note 61, at 11 (quoting 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 6I7.5(c)(33) (2009». 
73 [d. See Bd. of Visitors-Marcy Psychiatric Ctr. v. Coughlin, 453 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 1983). 
7.1 Reconstruction after 9/1 I did involve NEPA, and four ElS's were completed. Gerrard. supra note 61, at 11. 
75 42 U.S.c. § 5121-5207 (2009). 
76 Gerrard, supra note 61, at 11. 
77 42 USC § 5122(1). 
78 See infra Section lYB. 
79 Gerrard, supra note 61, at 12. 
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the hurricane hit, FEMA declared both states to be disaster areas. 80 Many emergency orders 
followed, exempting different operations from the standard environmental requirements. 81 For 
example, exemptions were granted for discharging pumped water into Lake Pontchartrain 
without a NPDES permit under the CW A, for depositing into wetlands without a CW A 404 
permit, as well as four different waivers of the Clean Air Act regarding fuel requirements. 82 
In November 2005, the American Bar Association's Section of Environment, Energy, and 
Resources expressed its concerns to the EPA about expanded exemptions to environmental laws 
in general. 83 "[T]he risks accompanying blanket exemptions to environmental regulations should 
not be removed without individual consideration of the dangers at issue."s4 
Congress has shown a greater willingness for passing NEP A exemptions than exemptions 
from other environmental statutes.85 While CEQ regulations provide for emergency exemptions 
from NEP A, Congress has consistently chosen to enact project specific exemptions instead of 
allowing agencies to use section 1506.11.86 A comprehensive list of congressional legislation 
that provided exemptions or modifications to NEP A is difficult to compile, due to the fact that 
Congress tends to provide specific exemptions in appropriation bills, buried in thousands of piles 
of provisions. 87 A second reason is that often Congress does not mention NEPA by name in the 




83Id. at 14. 
84 Id. 
85 Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 286 (citing Victor Sher and Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the 
Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Law, 15 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 435,438 
(1991». 
86 Id. at 286 (citing Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Illtegritv at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A 
COflstiutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 486 (1997». 
87Id. at 286-87. See generally Richard Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L. 1.619 (2006). 
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application to the project.88 An example of this is language such as legislation that directs action 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law." Courts have interpreted this to mean that the new 
statute supersedes or trumps other statutes that are not inconsistent, including NEP A. 89 
Also making the task more difficult is that Congress often includes provisos that 
eliminate or limit the scope of judicial review, and therefore there is less case law discussing 
h . 90 suc exemptIOns. 
1. Types of Exemptions to NEP A 
Public Law 106-398, § 1 of October 30,2000, provided that nothing in NEPA nor in any 
implementing regulations shall require the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaries of any of the 
military branches to prepare a programmatic nation-wide environmental impact statement for 
low-level flight training as a precondition to the use by the military of airspace for the 
performance of low-level training flights. 91 
a. Congressional Exemptions 
If a federal statute is in "clear and unavoidable conflict" with NEP A, then the federal 
agency is exempt from compliance with NEPA.92 While these types of legislative exemptions 
are rare,93 they include impositions by Congress of a mandatory duty on an agency,94 a direction 
88 Ehrlich, supra note 7. at 287 (citing Nat'l Coalition to Save our Mall v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 14,20-21 
(D.D.C 2001». 
89 Nat'l Coalition to Save our Mall, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
90 Ehrlich, supra note 7, at 287 (citing Sher & Hunting, supra note 85, at 438). 
91 Note to Sec. 2. 
92 I-I ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04 [4J. See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C 
Cir. 1977). 
93 I-I ENVTLLAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[4]. See, e.g., W. Neb. Res. Council v. EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 871-72 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (Safe Water Drinking Act); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-73 (10th Cir. 1975) (Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976): Warren County v. North Carolina, 
528 F. Supp. 276, 286-87 (E.D.N.C 1981) (Toxic Substances Control Act). 
94 I-I ENVTLLAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[4]. See Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 
1988) (biological assessment under Endangered Species Act cannot substitute entirely for environmental assessment 
despite Congress' declaration that assessment may be prepared as part of NEPA process). 
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to an agency that precludes the agency from considering environmental factors in its decision,95 
or replacement of NEP A procedures with other procedures. 96 The courts are split as to the issue 
of whether such exemptions must be explicit or whether they can be implied.97 
Most importantly, Congress at any point has the power to make specific statutory 
exemptions. For example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA's actions are exempt from NEPA 
requirements.98 Similarly, under the Clean Water Act, EPA actions other than providing grants 
to municipal wastewater treatment plants and issuing NPDES permits to new sources are 
exempt.99 
Congress has barred federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to determine whether an 
agency has complied with NEPA for a specific action, 100 and implicitly for certain types of 
actions. lol 
Congress has acted explicitly in rare circumstances to continue a program that would 
have been delayed or even halted by NEPA.l 02 For example, in the case of Earth Resources Co. 
95 1-1 ENVTL LA W PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[4]. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 
1986) (compliance with NEPA was not full compliance with Federal Land Policy and Management Act); Nat'l 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 1245, 1255 CD.D.C. 1977) (compliance with NEPA was not full compliance 
with Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act). 
96 1_1 ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUfDE § 1.04[4]; 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11. 
97 1-1 ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUfDE § 1.04[4]. See Nat'l Audubon Soc' y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 408 (9th Cir. 
1986); Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
98 Contained in the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,15 U.s.c. § 793(c)(I) (2009). 
9933 U.S.c. § I 372(a) (2009). 
100 I_I ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUfDE § 1.04[4]. See Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 904 
(9th Cir. 1994) (statute deeming that requirements of NEPA had been met regarding agency's approval of specified 
projects was not unconstitutional); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1993) (NEPA 
once again applied to decisions regarding logging in spotted owl habitat); Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. 
Lujan, 920 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (1987 Continuing Appropriations Act provided that no court had jurisdiction to 
consider factual or legal sufficiency of EIS prepared for specific proposal), ce11. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991); Envtl 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 655 F.2d 1244, 1246, (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rider to appropriations bill for Department of 
Interior declared that action should proceed as if final EIS had been filed). 
101 1-1 ENVTLLAW PRACTICE GUfDE § 1.04[4]. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to consider whether EPA complied with NEPA in selecting remedy under CERCLA 
because jurisdiction to review NEPA actions is provided by 28 u.s.c. § 1331 and 5 U.s.c. § 702, and CERCLA 
precludes review under those statutes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
102 Orsi, supra note 34, at 495 (citing Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act, 15 U.S.c. § 719(h)(c)(3) (1982); The 
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154, 87 Stat. 250, 275 (1973». Other projects exempted 
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of Alaska v. FERC, to3 litigation under NEPA caused work on the Alaska pipeline to stop. 
Congress restarted the project by enacting legislation making the President's decisions on the 
adequacy of an EIS conclusive, and by denying judicial review. to4 Congress chose to 
specifically exempt other federal projects in the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination 
Act of 1974,105 Disaster Relief Act of 1974,106 and Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973. 107 
b. Regulatory Exceptions 
On November 29th , 1978, in 40 c.F.R. § 1506. I I, the CEQ created the "emergency" 
exception to the requirement to prepare an EIS. 108 It was part of the initial regulations created 
for CEQ to implement NEPA in response to Executive Order 11991 of June 9th , 1978. The 
regulation has no direct statutory authority, but can be supported by 42 U.S.c. § 4331 (b), which 
says that it is the U.S. government's responsibility to "use all practicable means consistent with 
other essential considerations of national policy" when considering the environmental impacts of 
its actions. 109 The final version of the emergency exception was only slightly different from the 
draft. Ito The initial wording said that under emergency circumstances, "the Federal agency 
proposing to take the action should consult with the Council about alternative arrangements.,,111 
Out of concern that the regulation could be construed as requiring consultation before an 
emergency occurred, 112 the regulation was changed to read as it does today. I 13 Under this 
from NEPA include the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,15 U.S.c. § 793(c)(l) (1982); 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974,42 U.S.c. § 5175 (1982); and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,45 U.S.c. 
§ 791(c) (1976). 
103 617 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
104 Orsi, supra note 34, at 495. See Earth Res Co. of Alaska v. FERC, 617 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
105 15 U.S.c. § 793(c)(l) (1982). 
106 42 U.S.c. § 5175 (1984). 
107 45 U.S.c. § 791(c) (1976). 
108 43 Fed. Reg. 55978. 
109 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS-9. 
II01d. at CRS-IO. 
III 43 Fed. Reg. 25230, 25243 (June 9, 1978). 
112 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 55988 (Nov. 29, 1978). 
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exception, once CEQ determines than an emergency exists, it requires consultation between the 
agency and CEQ to prepare alternative arrangements to the preparation of an EIS.114 However, 
CEQ has not defined what situations it considers an emergency. I IS Furthermore, CEQ has not 
stated that § 1506.11 waives the statutory requirements for preparing an EIS. That is to say, if an 
agency has an emergency situation, can it undertake the major federal action without ever doing 
an EIS? The alternative is that it would undertake the action first, and then do an EIS, which 
runs contrary to the one of the purposes behind NEPA, which is to give decision-makers enough 
information in order to make an intelligent decision. 
Air Force regulations regarding the environmental impact analysis process allows for 
special and emergency procedures. I 16 While the regulation makes clear that emergency 
situations do not exempt the Air Force from complying with NEPA, "[ c ]ertain emergency 
situations may make in necessary to take immediate action having significant environmental 
impact, without observing all the provisions of the CEQ regulations .... If possible, promptly 
notify [headquarters], for .. , coordination and CEQ consultation, before undertaking emergency 
actions that would otherwise not comply with NEPA .... The instant notification requirement 
does not apply where emergency action must be taken without delay. Coordination in this 
instance must take place as soon as practicable." I 17 In applying this exception, the courts do not 
simply allow Department of Defense agencies to bypass NEP A, but will allow a military 
department to make a decision without going through public notice and comment 
. lIS 
reqUIrements. 
113 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS- J O. 
114 Orsi, supra note 34.40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 J. 
115 Orsi, supra note 34, at 484. 
116 32 C.F.R. § 989.34(b) (2009). 
1171d. 
118 Colonel E.G. Willard, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Zimmerman, and Lieutenant Colonel Eric Bee, Environmental 
Lmv and National Security: Can Existing Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DoD Training and 
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From November 1977 to September 2008, 41 alternative arrangements have been granted 
by CEQ.119 Of these, the highest number (twelve) dealt with water issues, followed by spraying 
of pesticides, killing of wildlife, military and military support, each at four. 120 Other random 
issues involved tree removal, dealing with fires, dealing with radioactive material, and the 
like. 121 Not surprisingly, the agency with the most requests for emergency exceptions was the 
U.S. Forest Service, followed by the Bureau of Land Management. 122 The various military 
departments of the Department of Defense requested emergency exceptions nine times - four 
from the Department of Army, two from the Department of Air Force, two from Army Corps of 
Engineers, and only one from the Department of the Navy. 123 The Bureau of Land Management 
has used 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 several times when it needed to build roads to provide access to a 
forest fire on their lands 
c. Exceptions Through Case Law 
Courts have generally held that federal agencies, and in particular EPA, do not have to 
prepare an EIS when it has already prepared a "functional equivalent.,,124 This doctrine states 
that when a federal agency must comply with procedures mandated by other federal statutes with 
regard to a proposed action, and when compliance with these procedures is the equivalent of 
Operational Prerogatives without New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 65, 82 (2004). See Westside Prop. Owners v. 
Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979). 
119 Alternative Arrangements Pursuant to 40 CFR Section 1506. I I -Emergencies (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.nepalgov/eisnepaieis/alternative_arrangcments_charc092908.pdf [hereinafter Alternative Arrangements 
Chart); \-1 ENVTLLAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[7J. 
120 Alternative Arrangements Chart, supra note 119. 
121 [d. 
122 ld. Forest Service and APHIS combined equaled a total of ten USDA requests, and BLM 
combined with US Fish & Wildlife Service combincd equaled a total of nine Department of the Intcrior requests. 
123 [d. 
1241_1 ENVTL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[6]. 
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compliance with NEP A, the agency does not have to duplicate procedures. 125 This doctrine has 
been applied mainly to regulatory actions taken by EPA. 126 
The general rule concerning extraterritoriality is that federal statutes are not presumed to 
apply outside of the United States unless there is clear indication by Congress. There is case law 
to say that NEPA does not apply to certain military actions on U.S. installations located in 
1'7 . . 1'8 129 Japan, - nor to movement of U.S. mumtIOns through Germany. - The EDF v. Massey case 
held that NEPA did apply to US action in Antarctica, but due to the particular nature of 
Antarctica not being part of any nation's sovereignty. 
The CEQ has issued guidance on NEPA analyses for proposed federal actions in the 
United States that may have effects extending across the border and affecting another country's 
environment. 130 CEQ determined that agencies must include analysis of reasonably foreseeable 
transboundary effects of proposed actions in their analysis of proposed actions in the United 
States. As a practical consideration, CEQ noted that federal agencies should use the scoping 
process set out in CEQ's NEPA regulations, 40 c.F.R. § 1501.7, to identify actions that may 
have such effects, and "should be particularly alert to actions that may affect migratory species, 
air quality, watersheds, and other components of the natural ecosystem that cross borders .... " 
125 fd. See, e.g., W. Neb. Res. Council v. EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1991) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 
Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-73 (10th Cir. 1975) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act), 
CelT. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 286-87 (E.D.N.C. 1981) 
(Toxic Substances Control Act); Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116, 121-22 (D. Md. 1976) (Ocean Dumping Act). 
See generally Alabama ex reI. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504-05 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing functional 
equivalency doctrine). 
126 1-1 ENYTL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.04[6]. See cases cited in note 125. Cj Found on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 
756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (NIH procedures for approving experiment involving genetically engineered 
organisms, conducted under agency guidelines, were not functional equivalent of environmental assessment). But 
see D'Agnillo v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 738 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (supplemental 
environmental review prepared by HUD was functional equivalent of comprehensive finding of no significant 
impact), affd, 923 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254 (1991). 
J27 NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993). 
128 Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991). 
129 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
130 CEQ memorandum of July I, 1997. 
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d. Categorical Exclusions 
A categorical exclusion (also known as a "CA TEX") is not an exemption from 
NEP A, but instead is an administrative way to simplify the paperwork for actions that do not 
have significant environmental impacts. I3I Federal agencies publish a list of types of actions that 
they perform in a regular basis that do not significantly affect the environment. For example, the 
Navy currently has 45 different CATEX's, for actions such as routine use of existing facilities, 
routine movement of mobile assets, such as ships and aircraft, for homeport reassignments, for 
repair, or to train/perform as operational groups where no new support facilities are required, and 
short-term increases in air operations. 132 However, segmentation of actions is not allowed. This 
means that a federal agency cannot take one big project that certainly would qualify as "major" 
and split it into, for example, the upgrade of one building,I33 the refitting of another building, 134 
the upgrade of pier facilities,135 and the change of homeport of a ship, 136 and give each project a 
CATEX, thereby bypassing doing an EA or EIS. 
2. Arguments Against Exemptions 
There are many critics to the use of exemptions, exceptions, or waivers to environmental 
laws, and in particular its use by the military. In an article written by Mr. Joel Reynolds, a senior 
attorney with the National Resources Defense Council, Mr. Reynolds cites to the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II, which was upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 137 to 
131 LTJG Jerome M. Altendorf, USCG, Applying the National Environmental Policy Act's 
(NEPA) Functional Equivalent Doctrine to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP), 2005 INTER'L OIL SPILL CONFERENCE, at 2. For a critique of the current process involving CATEX's, see 
Kevin H. Moriarity, Note: Circumventing the National Environmental Policy Act: Agency Abuse o/the Categorical 
Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2312 (2004). 
J32 32 C.P.R. §775.6(t); Chief of Naval Operations Inst. No. 5090.IC (Oct. 30, 2007). 
133 CATEX 14. Id. 
134 CATEX 8. Id. 
135 CATEX 8. Id. 
136 CATEX 11. ld. 
J37 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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showcase "judicial abdication" in face of military services use of the importance of defense 
readiness to support its actions. 138 In the environmental arena, he continues, similar claims have 
been asserted by the Navy in defending its compliance with environmental laws, but with "less 
success.,,139 
After the end of the Cold War, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney declared that 
"[ d]efense and the environment is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is 
impossible in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns.,,140 
Seemingly gone where the days when the environmental consequences of preparing for war were 
ignored and the public was denied access to information about such consequences. 141 In 1996, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive announcing its policy to "display 
environmental security leadership within DOD activities worldwide" by "[e]nsuring that 
environmental factors are integrated into DOD decision-making process" and "[p]rotecting, 
preserving, and, when required, restoring and enhancing the quality of the environment." 142 
138 Joel R. Reynolds, Submarines, Sonar, and the Death of Whales: Enforcing the Delicate Balance of 
Environmental Compliance and National Security in Military Training, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL'y REV. 
759, 759 (2008). 
139 1d. But note that his article was written before some of the cases he used as examples were concluded, and also 
be aware that "success" is all relative. 
140 Stephen Dycus, Osama's Submarine: National Security and Environmental Protection After 9111,30 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL L. & POL'Y REV. 1,3 (2005) (quoting Sec'y of Def. Richard B. Cheney, Address to the Defense & 
Environment Initiative Forum (Sept. 3, 1990». 
141 / d. 
142 1d. at 4 (quoting DOD Dir. No. 4715.1, Environmental Security (Feb. 24,1996». In 1996, the 
Department of Defense also issued the following instructions: DOD Inst. No. 4715.2, DoD Regional Environmental 
Coordination (May 3,1996), DOD Inst. No. 4715.3, Environmental Conservation Program (May 3, 1996), DOD 
Inst. No. 4715.4, Pollution Prevention (Jun. 18, 1996, Change 1 issued Jul. 6,1998), DOD Inst. No. 4715.5, 
Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations (Apr. 22, 1996), DOD Inst. No. 4715.6, 
Environmental Compliance (Apr 24, 1996), DOD Inst. No. 4715.7, Environmental Restoration Program (Apr. 22, 
1996), DOD Inst. No. 4715.9, Environmental Planning and Analysis (May 3,1996), and DOD Inst. No. 4715.10, 
Environmental Education, Training and Career Development (Apr. 24, 1996). Subsequent instructions are DOD 
Inst. No. 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities Overseas (Feb. 2,1998), DOD Inst. No. 4715.13, 
DOD Noise Program (Nov. 15,2005), DOD Inst. No. 4715.14, Operational Range Assessments (Nov. 30, 2005), 
DOD lnst. No. 4715.15, Environmental Quality Systems (Dec. 11,2005), DOD lnst. No. 4715.16, Cultural 
Resources Management (Sep. 18,2008), DOD Inst. No. 4715.17, Environmental Management Systems (Apr. 15, 
2009), and DOD Inst. No. 4715.18, Emerging Contaminants (ECS) (Jun. 11,2(09). 
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In the past decade, the Department of Defense and others in the George W. Bush 
administration have used the threat of a renewed terrorist attack to argue that environmental laws 
should be relaxed so as to enable the military to conduct proper training and for the development 
of new weapon systems necessary to execute the "war on terrorism.,,143 For example, in 2002, 
the Pentagon announced a multi-year campaign called Readiness and Range Preservation 
Initiative (RRPI), which was designed to promote sweeping changes the some of the most 
important environmentallaws. 144 RRPI included proposals to amend the Clean Air Act, the 
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, 
Compensation and Liability Act, and perhaps even the Clean Water Act. 145 Meanwhile, the 
Pentagon began to make steps to push for regulatory reforms that would make it easier for the 
military to comply with these laws. 146 
The Defense Department's request for broader exemptions was, needless to say, 
contentious in Congress. 147 Some agreed that such exemptions are necessary to provide greater 
flexibility for combat training and other such readiness activities. 148 Other members of 
Congress, plus states, communities, and environmental organizations, opposed broader 
exemptions, concerned about the degree to which environmental requirements have 
143 Dycus, supra note 140, at I. 
144 Id. at 1-2. 
1451d. at 2. 
146 Jd. (citing memo from Paul W. Mayberry to Sec'ys of Military Dept's et a!., Senior Readiness 
Oversight Council Approval of 2003 Sustained Range Action Agenda (Dec 10.2(02), available at 
http://www . peer.org/docs/dod/DoD _2003attacks.pdf). 
147 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Exemptions from Environmental Law for the 




compromised military readiness overall. 149 They also argued that expanding exemptions without 
a clear national security need could unnecessarily weaken environmental protection. ISO 
In response to the Department of Defense's request, the lOih Congress enacted an 
exemption from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and then the 108th Congress enacted exemptions 
from the Marine Mammal Protection Act, as well as from some designations of military lands as 
critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act. ISI There was greater opposition to requests 
for exemptions to the Clean Air Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and CERCLA, and to date, 
Congress has not enacted these exemptions. 152 
A study by the Congressional Research Service in 2005 said that "[a]lthough DOD has 
cited some example of training restrictions or delays at certain installations and has used these as 
a basis for seeking legislative remedies, the department does not have a system in place to 
comprehensively track these case and determine their impact on readiness." 153 This echoes what 
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman said in early 2003: "I don't believe that there is a 
training mission anywhere in the country that is being held up or not taking place because of 
environmental protection regulation."ls4 Perhaps most strongly worded were Congressman John 




1521d. DOD requested them in the Administration's defense authorization proposals for Fiscal Year 2003 through 
2008, but the FY2009 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658 and S. 2787) did not include the exemptions. 
153 Dycus, supra note 140, at 9 (quoting David M. Bearden, Exemptions from Environmental Laws for the Defense 
Department: An Overview ofCong'l Action (Cong. Res. Servo RS 22149) (June 2, 2005, updated May 1,2008) at 3, 
available at http://digital.library.unt.edulgovdocs/crs/permalinklmeta-crs-I 0640: I). 
154 Id. at 9-10 (quoting Eric Pianin, Environmental Exemptions Sought; For Readiness Efforts, Pentagon Says It 
Needs Relief from Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2003, at A21 (discussing a hearing before the Senate Environment & 
Public Works Committee». 
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get out from under environmental laws. But using the threat of 9-11 and al Qaeda to get 
unprecedented environmental immunity is despicable.,,15s 
The General Accounting Office conducted a study to determine the extent to which 
environmental requirements have affected military readiness, and in March 2008, issued its 
findings. It found that while environmental requirements did cause some training activities to be 
delayed, cancelled or altered, the readiness data did not indicated that those actions had 
hampered military readiness overall. 156 
The House Armed Services Committee also directed GAO to look at the effect of military 
exemptions on the environment. ls7 Based on information from regulatory agencies, GAO's 
report in March 2008 did not identify any instances in which the use of the new exemptions from 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act had adversely affected the 
environment. 158 However, as far as the effects from the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
exemptions, they could not yet be determined. 159 
In the arena of military action versus environmental compliance, because of the potential 
gravity of a wrong decision, doubts are usually resolved against environmental interests, 
especially during time of war or a great national emergency. 160 Congress, however, included 
1551d. at 10 (quoting Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democrats, Bush Administration take Aim at 
Migratory Birds: Legislation Unilaterally Exempts Military from Environmental Law (Oct. 22, 2002), available at 
http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/press/ 1 07 nr59 .shtml). 
156 CRS Report - DoD Exemptions, at CRS-3 (citing GAO, Military Training: Compliance with Environmental 
Laws Affects Some Training Activities, but DOD Has Not Made a Sound Business Case for Additional 
Environmental Exemptions, GAO-08-407, March 2008). GAO had issued prior reports with similar findings. GAO, 
Military Training: DOD lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614, 
June 2002, and GAO, Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training Ranges Still 
Evolving, GAO-03-621 T, April 2003. 
157 CRS Report - DoD Exemptions, at CRS-3. 
158 1d. 
159 Id. 
160 Dycus, supra note 140, at 5. 
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provisions in most environmental statutes that allow for their temporary waiver on a case-by-
case basis, in order to respond to these types of crises. 161 
III. Court Cases Involving the Emergency Exception 
Because 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 does not define "emergency" or give examples of what 
types of situations qualify for the exception, nor is there anything in the legislative history of the 
CEQ's regulations, the next step is to turn to the courts. While only 41 emergency exceptions 
and alternative arrangements have been granted by CEQ, only three of those cases resulted in 
legal challenges through the federal court system. Consequently, there is a dearth of guidance. 
A. Cases Decided Based Upon a Finding of the Applicability of the Emergency 
Exception 
1. Crosby v. Young 
The first case citing the emergency exception contained in section 1506.11, set the tone 
for its future uses. 162 This case involved General Motor's construction of a new plant, planned in 
100 acres of residential and commercial land in Poletown, a part of Detroit (Central Industrial 
Park or "CIP,,).163 The residents of Poletown proposed a smaller site, and the issue was litigated 
in state court. 164 When that was unsuccessful, Plaintiffs filed in federal court, alleging, amongst 
other things that HUD released funds prior to the EIS, in violation of NEP A. 165 As for the 
timeline, HUD approved the loan to the city of Detroit on October 1, 1980, and released the 
funds on October 31, 1980. 166 The Draft EIS was issued on October 17, 1980, and the Final EIS 
161 Id. at 4. 
162 Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
163 Id. at 1365. 
164 Id. 
1651d. at 1367. 
166 Id. at 1376. 
27 
was published on December 22, 1980, with the Record of Decision signed on February 10, 
1981. 167 
However, prior to approval of the Section 108 application, Detroit asked CEQ for 
guidance under section 1506.11 because emergency circumstances made it difficult to comply 
with CEQ regulations, and suggested alternative arrangements. CEQ agreed, and in their 
response, acknowledged that the CIP project could not go forward unless federal financial 
assistance was committed by October 1, 1980. 168 
Plaintiffs argued that CEQ cannot permit federal action to begin before an EIS has been 
prepared, under NEPA section 4332(2)(C).169 They did not claim that CEQ cannot modify or 
waive its own regulations, but that it lacked authority to change the statutory requirements of 
NEP A. 170 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, 
disagreed. 171 "It is immediately apparent that CEQ not only had the authority to waive its own 
regulations for Detroit, but also to interpret the provisions of NEP A to accommodate emergency 
circumstances.,,172 Plaintiffs claimed that CEQ allowed the exception solely because the 
construction site needed to be cleared by May 1,1981, and the elderly needed to be relocated 
before winter. 173 The court scoffed, saying that although those were some of the reasons cited in 
CEQ's letter of concurrence, there were other factors, such as unemployment, crime, a 
decreasing tax base, and a decrease in bond rating below investment grade. 174 "The necessity of 
federal funds to complete the CIP project has never been questioned and it was the need to have 
a commitment from HUD, and not the relocation of persons before the onset of winter, that 
1671d. 
168 Id. at 1380. 
1691d. at 1384-85 (citing 24 C.ER. § 58.17(f)(5»). 
170 Crosby, at 1385. 





prompted the request.,,175 Accordingly, the court found that HUD, through Detroit's actions, had 
been properly permitted to make alternative arrangements, and the release of the Section 108 
loan guarantee before the completion of an EIS was proper. 176 
2. National Audubon Society v. Hester 
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in December 1985 issued a permit authorizing the 
capture and removal of all six surviving wild California condors. 177 This was a change in their 
previous position, but was in response to the loss of six of the then fifteen wild condors over the 
winter of 1984-85. 178 The Service contacted CEQ, and CEQ certified that due to the urgent 
nature of the Service's concerns about condor mortality, immediate documentation of the 
environmental effects of the proposal was unnecessary. 179 Plaintiffs, the National Audubon 
Society, sued for a preliminary injunction, and the District COUlt for the District of Columbia 
granted the injunction. 180 In its opinion, the court used language like "circumventing" and 
"avoid[ing]" compliance with NEPA, with regards to the Service's actions. I8 ! The court also 
pointed out that the only document explaining the need for an emergency exception was a letter 
from CEQ general counsel to the Director of the Service, stating that "[FWS] views this action as 
an emergency due to the precipitous decline in the number of Condors in the past year (6 
Condors have been lost from the wild population).,,182 The court concluded, "[t]his, however, is 
a questionable basis for the finding of an 'emergency. ",[83 The six Condors referred to had been 
175 Jd. at 1396-97. 
176 Jd. at 1397. 
J77 Nat'J Audubon Soc'y v. Hester, 627 F. Supp. 1419, 1421 (D.D.C. 1986). The remaining 20 condors were in zoos 
in Los Angeles and San Diego as part of breeding programs designed to prevent extinction. Nat'j Audubon Soc'y v. 
Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
178 627 F. Supp. at 1421. 
179 Jd. at 1423. 
180Id. at 1425. 




lost eight months before the Service requested the exception, and the record was "very sparse 
and limited in support of FWS' assertions." 184 
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 185 It found 
that the Service's decision constituted a "reasoned exercise of its discretion in fulfilling its 
statutory mandate .... ,,186 The Court of Appeal's holding rested on a finding that FWS adequately 
complied with NEP A in its earlier EA and an Addendum issued after it changed its mind about 
the remaining six wild Condors. 187 In a footnote, it says that "in any event," since CEQ's 
interpretation of NEP A is entitled to substantial deference, 188 the District Court erred in saying 
that no emergency existed. 189 
3. Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. West 
In this, the only emergency exception case involving the military, the Plaintiffs were a 
nonprofit citizen's association of approximately 350 members, all of who lived in communities 
bordering Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts. 190 The Defendants were the Secretary of 
the Air Force, and the Chairman of the CEQ. 191 The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the Air Force from flying C-5A transport airplanes in and out of Westover AFB between 
10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. l92 
As history, in April 1987, the Air Force issued an EIS, evaluating the effects of the 
presence and operation of 16 C-5A planes on the environment, and then transferred planes to 
184 Id. 
185 801 F.2d at 405. 
1861d. 
1871d. at 408. 
188/d. at 408, n. 3 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979». 
189 Id. 
190 Valley Citizens for a Safe Env. V. West, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21863, * I, n. 1 (D. Mass. May 6, 1991). 
191 Id. at * I. 
1921d. 
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Westover AFB. 193 The Plaintiffs had filed to enjoin the transfer, but were denied by the District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts. 194 The EIS provided that no military activity would be 
routinely scheduled between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. 195 Nonetheless, in September 1990, the 
Air Force began flying C-5A's on a 24-hour schedule, due to Operation Desert Storm. 196 
Plaintiffs requested the Air Force to prepare a Supplemental EIS 197 in order to evaluate the 
environmental impacts of the nighttime flights, especially with regards to noise, but the Air 
Force refused. 198 Instead, it told the Plaintiffs that CEQ had granted emergency provisions and 
allowed the Air Force to forego with strict compliance with NEPA. 199 On March 25, 1991, 
Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 200 Besides the claim for declaratory 
judge that Air Force had violated NEP A and CEQ regulations by failing to do an SEIS before 
beginning nighttime C-5A flights, they also sought declaratory judgment that CEQ had acted 
arbitrary and capricious by allowing Air Force to conduct such flights without NEP A 
compliance, and sought injunctive relief to stop the nighttime flights?OI 
As the court noted, as of the date of its opinion on May 6,1991, C-SA's continued to fly 
at Westover AFB both day and night, transporting machines, equipment, and military personnel 
to and from the Middle East. 202 The Air Force would not tell the court a set date that nighttime 
1931d. at *3. 
1941d. (citing Valley Citizens for a Safe Env. v. Aldridge, 695 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1988), 
aff'd by 886 F.2d 458 (I s( Cir. 1989)). 
195 Id. at *4. 
1961d. at *5. 
197 While NEPA does not explicitly require SEIS's, 40 c.F.R. section 1502.9 does require an SEIS under certain 
circumstances - if the agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action relevant to environmental concerns, 
or if there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the 
proposed action or impacts. Valley Citizens, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21863 at *5, n. 5. 
198 Id. 
1991d. 
200 Id. at *6. 
201 Id. at *6-7. 
202 Id. at *7. 
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operations would stop, but did indicated that it anticipated that the flights would end by July 
1991.203 
In deciding whether Defendants had violated NEP A by not doing an SEIS before 
beginning nighttime operations, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts first focused 
on language in NEPA itself. 204 It began with the fact that while section 4332 of NEPA requires 
that an agency prepare an EIS with regard to proposed environmentally significant federal action 
"to the fullest extent possible," section 4332 does not make completion of an EIS mandatory in 
all circumstances.205 The District Court stated that it would not read the Flint case as compelling 
an EIS under any circumstance unless statutory mandates conflict.206 "Congress could not have 
intended NEPA to cripple the quick response capabilities of federal agencies where failures to 
take immediate action could result in dire consequences.,,207 The court next examined the 
language in NEPA section 4331, specifically the "consistent with other essential considerations 
of national policy," to support its position that other goals or interests of the United States may 
make strict compliance with NEPA impossible.208 
Finally, the District Court cited to section 1506.11, the emergency exception to NEPA, 
and its allowance of alternative arrangements.209 As a whole, the court concluded, the statutory 
language of NEPA and the applicable CEQ regulation make clear that while NEPA ordinarily 
203 Id. 
2().j [d. at *10-11. 
205!d. (citing Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic River Assn., 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976) (Supreme Court construed "to 
the fullest extent possible" as meaning must strictly comply unless such compliance would create an "irreconcilable 
and fundamental conflict" with other statutory obligations."». 
206 Valley Citizens, 199 I U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2 1863 at * II, n. 6. 
207 Id. The court felt its interpretation was consistent with NEPA section 4331 and case law from 
other jurisdictions, and cited Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and Crosby v. Young, 
512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
208 Valley Citizens, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21863 at *12 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,421 (1976)). 
209 Valley Citizens, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21863 at * 12-13. 
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requires completion of an EIS, or SEIS in this case, emergency circumstances may make 
completion of the NEP A document unnecessary. 210 
In this case, the parties disagreed as to what constituted an "emergency." Both the Air 
Force and CEQ determined that the continuing and unstable situation in the Middle East created 
')11 
an emergency.- "Defendants contend that the C-SAs at Westover AFB carry a steady stream of 
equipment and personnel essential to military operations at home and abroad, and that disruption 
of the twenty-four hour operation could create unmanageable scheduling and supply 
problems.,,212 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, point out that even if an emergency existed before, 
the fighting ended in March 1991, and therefore there is no emergency now. 213 
The court held that the decision by the Air Force and CEQ that the crisis in the Middle 
East constituted an emergency was not arbitrary and capricious, and granted Defendants' motion 
for summary judgment.214 Various Air Force officials provided affidavits describing a complex, 
global flight schedule that relied on the 24-hour availability of Westover AFB' s C-SA 
capabilities.2ls Westover AFB was one of the few bases in the United States capable of 
servicing, maintaining, and supplying C-SAs, and one of only two C-SA staging bases in the 
United States for all operations in the Persian GUlf.216 Looking at the evidence presented, the 
court found that the Defendants could reasonably interpret the current crisis to be an emergency 
within the meaning of NEPA and CEQ regulations, given the military's operational and 
scheduling difficulties, and the hostile and unpredictable nature of the Persian Gulf region.217 




214 1d. at *16, *21. 
215 Id. at *16. 
216 1d. at * 17. The other base was Dover AFB, which was already operating a near maximum 
capacity. Stewart AFB did not have the C-SA parking and other capabilities, and so could not be used. Id. 
217 Id. at * 17-18. 
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The court stressed that the Air Force did not try to justify the nighttime operations by vague 
. f' I' ld ~18 assertIOns 0 natIOna securIty or wor peace.-
Additionally, the court pointed out that alternative arrangements were agreed upon by Air 
Force and CEQ.219 Air Force planned to do an EA by May 1991, analyzing alternative flight 
scheduling possibilities, noise impacts, and reduced nighttime operations. 22o Although ruling 
against them, the court did sympathize with the Plaintiffs' situation, and threatened that if 
nighttime operations continued after July 1991, "this Court will not hesitate to invoke, where 
necessary, all of the equitable powers at its disposal to protect Valley Citizens' members from 
continued nighttime disturbances."ZZl 
B. Cases Where the Emergency Exception Was Discussed But Decided on Other 
Grounds 
1. Cohen v. Price Commission 
Another early case in which the emergency exception was discussed was this 1972 case. 
Plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief alleging that an order of the Price Commission which 
authorized a five-cent subway and bus fare increase, toll increases on bridges and tunnels, and an 
increase in parking charges, violated NEPA in that the Commission failed to do a detailed 
statement on the impact, and failed to consult other agencies. 222 The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York denied their motion, finding that they had failed to show a 
likelihood of success,223 failed to show irreparable injury,224 and that the balance of hardship 
218ld.at*J8. 
1191d. 
210 ld. at * J 9. 
221 Id. at *20-21. 
222 Cohen v. Price Comm' n, 337 F. Supp. J 236, J 239 (S.D.N.Y. J 972). 
223 Id. at J 242. 
mId. at 1243. 
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favored the defendants. 225 On the issue of likelihood of success, the court allowed that 
Defendants had not prepared a detailed statement of the environmental consequences of the 
proposed action, and had not submitted the action for consideration by other federal agencies. 226 
However, 
... the Guidelines promulgated under NEP A clearly recognize that there may be 
emergency situations where the public interest requires immediate and prompt 
action. 227 Each week that the proposed price increase was delayed would have 
endangered the continued viability of New York City's mass transit system and 
brought the City closer to total paralysis.228 
The court in its holding considered the purpose of the Price Commission and the fact that 
Congress intended it to act quickly.229 Congress also exempted it from the Administrative 
Procedures Act, and limited the powers of the courts to use injunctive relief. 230 The District 
Court went so far as to say that there was doubt as to the applicability of NEPA at all to the 
actions of the Price Commission.231 
2. Sierra Club v. Hassell 
The Sierra Club and NRDC, private environmental groups, sued the Federal Highway 
Administration and U.S. Coast Guard, as well as state agencies, in 1981, claiming that Plaintiffs' 
failure to do an EIS violated NEP A. 232 They sought to enjoin the construction of a federally-
funded bridge connecting Dauphin Island to mainland Alabama. 233 The original bridge had been 
destroyed in Hurricane Frederic in 1979.234 After the hurricane, the President declared the area 












help restore damaged roads and bridges. 235 Dauphin Island was partially developed, with several 
hundred full- and part-time residents, and a number of commercial and military 
establishments. 236 The island also contained substantial wetlands, bird and wildlife habitats, and 
sites of archaeological importance.:m 
The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama denied injunctive relief, holding 
that Defendants complied with NEP A, by sufficiently considering potential adverse 
environmental impacts of the new bridge, alternatives, and mitigation measures.238 The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed, stating that the agencies found that an EIS was not 
necessary, and the record supports that they were reasonable in so concluding.239 It did go on to 
say that the decision did not mean that it would have been unreasonable or undesirable for the 
agencies to have classified this as a major action under NEPA, especially considering the project 
required $30 million in funding, and a construction period of two years, which certainly look like 
"major action.,,24o But the court continued that even if the Defendants had determined the 
project was a "major action," they still could have found that the action would not have 
significant effects on the environment, and thus no EIS was necessary.241 "Alternatively, the 
agencies might have chosen to prepare an impact statement pursuant to expedited procedures set 
forth in the regulations for emergency situations.,,242 
This result does not seem surprising, that the rebuilding of a bridge after a hurricane 





238 Id. at 1099. 
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W Jd. (citing 23 C.F.R. § 771.11; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13). 
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3. State of South Carolina v. O'Leary 
In July 1993, the Secretary of Energy proposed a three-tiered way to deal with the 
Department of Energy's recent cease of receipt of foreign reactor spent fuel. 243 First, the agency 
would do an EIS for the long-term plan for selecting a site and constructing a facility to receive 
744 24,000 spent fuel rods from European research reactors. - Second, an EA would be done for the 
immediate receipt of a few hundred spent fuel rods in urgent need of shipment for storage at an 
existing site in South Carolina.245 Lastly, they would ask for and receive declaration of an 
emergency situation under 40 C.P.R. § 1506.11 for reactor facilities whose situation was so 
urgent that they could not wait for EA completion. 246 
After the preparation of the EA, which was released in April 1994, the agency determined 
that 409 rods were in urgent need of shipment, and that there would be no significant 
environmental impact if shipped to the South Carolina site.247 In September 1994, South 
Carolina filed for an injunction to halt the shipment of the 409 rods, saying that the EA was 
inadequate, and an EIS was needed?48 The District Court granted the injunction?49 At that time, 
153 of the rods were already onboard vessels in the Atlantic Ocean, and on September 23, 1994, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed the injunction, holding that South Carolina 
had failed to show harm sufficient to outweigh the United States' foreign policy interest in 
243 State of South Carolina v. O'Leary, 64 F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 1995). Part of the U.S.' longstanding policy for the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was the practice to try to convert foreign nuclear reactors from using highly-
enriched uranium which also may be used to make nuclear weapons, to low-enriched uranium, which cannot. Under 
this program, the U.S. would accept highly-enriched spent nuclear rods from European research facilities for storage 
in the U.S., and in turn, supplied nuclear fuel to these facilities. We would reprocess the spent fuel rods back into 
research reactors, or into our own nuclear weapon program. At the end of the Cold War, we stopped reprocessing 
spent fuel rods, but still permanently stored spent fuel rods. !d. at 894-95. 




248 Id. at 896. 
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receiving the spent fuel rods.25o In January 1995, the District Court issued a permanent 
injunction for further shipments, stating that DOE had improperly segmented the receipt of 
24,000 rods. 251 However, the Fourth Circuit once again went against the District Court, and 
reversed its judgment and injunction. 252 It concluded that DOE had fulfilled its responsibilities 
under NEP A by doing an EA. Interestingl y, it did not discuss the use of section 1506.11. 
4. NRDC v. Pena 
In another case involving the Department of Energy, Plaintiffs, more than thirty public 
interest organizations concerned about environmental waste and nuclear proliferation,253 claimed 
that DOE had to complete a Supplemental Programmatic EIS (SPEIS) for its Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management (SSM) Program. 254 Part of the program was the reestablishment 
of plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and to initiate 
construction and operation of the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory in California. 255 In 1996, DOE had done a Programmatic EIS for the Stockpile 
Program, but now Plaintiffs claimed that there existed new information concerning potential 
environmental hazards at Los Alamos and Livermore facilities, thus necessitating a 
Supplemental PElS to consider the changed circumstances. 256 The DOE maintained that they 
had met their obligations under NEP A and no SPEIS was needed. 257 In May 1997, Plaintiffs 
filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the construction of new facilities and 
major upgrades to mission capabilities.258 Plaintiffs argued that the PElS failed to address 
250ld. 
251 Jd. 
252 Jd. at 900. 
253 NRDC v. Pena, 20 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 1998). 






DOE's entire proposed SSM plan, and that it failed to vigorously explore and objectively 
evaluate reasonable alternatives to the SSM plan. 259 
In August 1997, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied Plaintiff s motion 
on grounds that the Plaintiff did not appear likely to succeed on the merits, and that national 
security interests associated with implementing the SSM Program outweighed Plaintiff s 
immediate environmental concerns?60 Then in January 1998, Plaintiffs filed motion for leave to 
amend the complaint, based on the new information it had?61 In response, the Defendants 
prepared two Supplement Analyzes under DOE's NEPA regulations,262 and based on these, 
determined that it did not need to do an SPEIS. 263 The parties entered into settlement 
negotiations, resulting in the DOE agreeing to prepare another Supplement Analysis, 
concentrating on implementation of plutonium pit production at Los Alamos, and if certain 
conditions were met, it would do an SPEIS.264 
The District Court then dismissed Plaintiff s complaint as not being ripe. 265 Plaintiffs 
argued that the Defendants were just stalling, but the court felt that DOE made the offers in good 
faith. 266 The court order said 
[iJn the event the President's Council on Environmental Quality issues an 
exemption to DOE pursuant to 40 C.P.R. § 1506.11 on national security 
emergency grounds for any of the actions identified in this Order, DOE may begin 
2591d. at 47-48. 
260 [d. at 48. 
261 [d. at 48. It specifically alleged that the new information about recent scientific studies and 
independent review by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board revealing serious seismic and safety risks 
associated with Los Alamos, the DOE's recent decision to use weapon grade plutonium in the same building as 
plutonium 238, increasing the changes of plutonium fires like those that occurred at Rocky Flats, a new 
congressionally mandated plan to design and build larger pit production facilities at multiple sites, and new 
f,roposals to conduct experiments at Livermore using hazardous and radioactive materials. [d. 
_
62 ld.; IOC.F.R. 1021.314(c). 
263 Pena, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 48. 
264 Id. 
265 ld. at 49. 
2661d. 
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implementation of such exempted action before completing the NEP A document 
required by this Order.267 
It is interesting that the court seemingly sua sponte raised the issue of the emergency exception, 
and moreover, in doing so, characterized it as a "national security emergency" exception, 
contrary to the language in the regulation which does not mention national security at all. 
5. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States 
In this 2007 case, the Plaintiff, the Miccosukee Tribe268 challenged a series of water 
management decisions made by the Defendant, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which were 
designed to avoid harm to the endangered Cape Sable seaside sparrow in the Everglades National 
Park, while at the same time administering Congressionally authorized programs269 aimed at 
balancing the water needs of Florida.27o One of the water delivery methods had negative effects 
on the sparrow population in the Everglades, which caused the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to 
ask the Army Corps of Engineers to reduce water levels in the nesting habitat. 271 The Army 
Corps of Engineers requested and received approval from CEQ for emergency alternative 
arrangements, and deviated from its current operations.272 Part of the alternative arrangements 
was that it would prepare an EA after it began its new course of operations, and that it would 
ultimately prepare an EIS for longer-term plans.273 A Draft EIS was issued in February 2001, 
and after the public comment period and meetings, the Corps issued a Supplemental EIS, 
267 ld. at 50. 
268 Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians of Florida v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Intervenors 
were NRDC, Florida Wildlife Federation, Izaak Walton League of America, National Park Conservation 
Association, National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, and the Cape Sable seaside sparrow (who was dismissed 
for lack of standing). ld. at 1289. 
269 The Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control and Other Purposes, part of the Flood Control Act of 
June 30, 1948, and the report was published in House Document No. 643, 80th Congress, Second Session. 
270 Miccosukee, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. 
27I Id. 
272 Id. at 1289. 
273 Id. at 1291. 
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choosing to implement an alternative that had not even been in the Draft EIS?74 The Final EIS 
was issued in May 2002, with this new alternative, and the Record of Decision was published 
July 3,2002.275 
Plaintiffs filed suit in September 2002, alleging violations of both NEP A and the 
Endangered Species Act. 276 The District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted 
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the NEP A issue, dismissing all the others, and 
ordered the Corps to do a Supplemental EIS that included the changes.277 The Corps did so, and 
a Final Supplemental EIS was issued on December 21, 2006.278 In March 2007, the District 
Court asked the parties if there remained any issues, and Plaintiffs filed this suit for injunctive 
relief, alleging that the Final SEIS was inadequate.279 The District Court denied the motion, 
holding that Plaintiffs failed to show that it was inadequate, a requirement to issuing an 
injunction.28o 
In this case, the issue of whether an emergency exception existed that justified the grant 
of alternative arrangements to completing a full EIS before the Corps' initial plans took place 
was not discussed by the court, not having been challenged by the Plaintiffs. But it can serve as 




276Id. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the AP A, 5th Amendment due process, the Indian Trust doctrine, the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as well as nuisance under federal common law and improper delegation of agency 
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277 Id. at 1291-92. See Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D. Fla., 2006). 
278 Id. at 1292. 
279Id. 
280Id. at 1295. 
41 
6. Hale v. Norton 
In 2002, plaintiffs, the Hales, purchased 410 acres of land in Alaska. 28 ! The property was 
surrounded by National Park, and access to the property was by way of a road that the state of 
Alaska and classified as abandoned in 1938.282 In the spring of 2003, the Hales' house on the 
property burned down, and in the rebuilding, the Hales used a bulldozer on the road in order to 
transport building material, without getting authorization from the National Park Service. 283 In 
July 2003, the Hales contacted the National Park Service about obtaining a permit to use the 
road. 284 The Park Service responded promptly, and offered assistance in the preparation of the 
permit application. 285 
In September 2003, the Hales submitted an "emergency" application, saying that they 
needed to get their supplies in before the "freeze Up.,,286 The Park Service asked for more 
information about the nature of the emergency, and also pointed out that others in the area are 
able to use bulldozers in the winter months, and in fact, the frozen ground helps protect the 
land.287 Since the Hales wanted to travel on unfrozen ground, which causes significantly more 
damage, the Park Service informed them that an Environmental Assessment would need to be 
done?88 The Park Service also told the Hales that it did not see this as falling within the 
emergency exception to NEP A, under section 1506.11.289 










The Park Service offered to complete the EA in nine weeks, and would cover the costs 
itself, but that the Hales still needed to provide more information. 29o The Hales did not respond, 
and instead sued in November 2003. 291 The District Court for the District of Alaska denied the 
motion for injunction, and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 292 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was subject matter jurisdiction, but upheld 
the denial of injunctive relief, holding that the Park Service had acted reasonably in requiring an 
EA.293 
While the Ninth Circuit did not discussed whether section 1506.11 could have been used 
to relieve the Park Service of some of the requirements of NEP A, the case is useful to show what 
an agency considers to be an "emergency." Moreover, even if a court thought that the agency 
was wrong and that the Hales' situation did constitute an emergency, it is doubtful that they 
would have found the Park Service's actions as unreasonable, given the deference to agency 
decisions. 
IV. Navy Mid-Frequency Active [MFA] Sonar Litigation Cases 
A. Training and MFA 
The Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP) is one of the Navy's ways to comply with the 
Chief of Naval Operation's obligation under 10 U.S.c. § 5062, which requires organization, 
training, and equipping of all naval forces for combat. 294 The FRTP is an arduous training cycle 
290 Id. at 697. 
291 Id. Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring NPS to provide adequate access to their property, and a declaratory 
judgment that NPS for violating their right-of-way over the road by requiring a permit. as well as that issuing a 
~ermit for the road did not constitute major federal action subject to NEPA requirements. 
_92 Id. The court held that there was no final agency action that permitted review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act,S U.S.c. § 704. 
293 Hale, 476 F.3d at 700-01. 
294 Decision Memorandum Accepting Alternative Arrangements for the U.S. Navy's Southern California Operating 
Area Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEXs) and Joint Task Force Exercises (JTFEXs) Scheduled To 
Occur Between Today and January 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 4189, 4189 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Navy's Acceptance]. 
43 
that ensures that naval forces achieve the highest possible readiness levels before deploying?95 
As a part of the FRTP, the Navy engages in Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEX) and 
Joint Task Force Exercises (JTFEX) in order to achieve this required readiness. 296 Both 
COMPTUEX and JTFEX exercise are included in the integrated phase of training for United 
States and some allied forces, which requires a synthesis of both individual units and of staff into 
a coordinated Strike Group, one that is prepared for surge and readiness certification.297 
Anti-submarine warfare is the Pacific Fleet's top war-fighting priority, and essential to 
the nation's defense. 298 Today's quiet, diesel-electric submarines have state-of-the-art sound 
silencing technologies, and sound isolation technologies. 299 Moreover, the use advanced 
propulsion systems that include high endurance battery systems, and air-independent propulsion 
systems?OO These advances, together with special hull treatments that significantly dampen 
submarine noise and reduce its vulnerability to active sonar prosecution, make them highly 
potent adversaries.301 Detecting, identifying, tracking, and if required, neutralizing these diesel-
electric submarines is vitally important to the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct operations and 
ultimately prevail in conflict.302 
Diesel-electric submarines such as these can operate covertly in coastal and open oceans, 
blocking Navy access to combat zones and increasing American vessels' vulnerability to torpedo 
and anti-ship missile attacks.303 Submarines are operated by a number of navies, including 
potential adversaries in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East areas. U.S. Navy Strike Groups are 
2951d. 
296 Id. at 4189-90. 








continuously deployed to these high-threat areas. 304 Accordingly, in preparing for these 
missions, the thousands of service members that comprise a Pacific Fleet Strike Group must train 
in the use of MFA sonar in a coordinated manner, in a realistic environment, prior to 
deployment. 305 The Southern California Operating Area is uniquely suited to COMPTUEX and 
JTFEX because it contains all the land, air, and at-sea bases necessary for conducting the 
exercises, and the shallow coastal areas realistically simulate areas where the Navy is likely 
. h '1 b . 306 gomg to encounter OStl e su mannes.' 
Mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar emits pulses of sound from an underwater transmitter 
in order to determine the size, distance, and speed of objects in the water.307 The sound waves 
bounce off objects and reflect back as an echo to underwater acoustic receivers. 308 It has a range 
up to ten nautical miles,309 and operates within the 1 kHz to 10 kHz frequency range. 3lO MFA 
sonar has been in use since World War II, and "is the only reliable way to identify, track, and 
target submarines.,,3ll Active sonar is different from passive sonar in that passive sonar only 
receives sound waves; it does not emit them.3l2 According to the Navy, passive sonar is 
ineffective at detecting quiet submarines, such as those that run on batteries rather than nuclear 
reactors, which are noisy?l3 
Scientists have suggested that MFA sonar may harm certain marine mammals, especially 
beaked whales. Opponents of MFA sonar point out that sonar is emitted at 170 to 195 decibels, 




307 See http://www.navy.milloceans/sonar.html. 
308 [d. 
309 Id. 
310 Navy's Acceptance, supra note 294, at 4 I 90. 




protection for humans. 314 However, noise intensities in the air and the water differ, because of 
the different densities of the media, and therefore are not comparable.315 Excessive noise can 
damage the ears of mammals, or can disorient the animals so that they surface too quickly, 
giving them "the bends," which can be fatal. 316 Strandings are also a possible effect of noise. 
The Navy agrees that sonar can harm marine mammals under some circumstances, but 
argues that the Navy takes additional protective measures to avoid such harm?17 In a December 
20th , 2007 press release, the Navy stated that it takes 29 mitigation measures to protect marine 
mammals during military exercises involving sonar, and that no injuries to marine mammals has 
been attributed to sonar use since the measures were put in place in January, 2007?18 
The habitat and species contained in the Southern California Operating Area have been 
monitored over the last 40 years, during the same time period that the Navy has been using MFA 
sonar.
319 There have been no documented incidents of harm, injury, or death to marine mammals 
resulting from their exposure to MFA sonar, nor have there been stranding incidents or 
population-level effects. 32o No systematic declines in marine mammal stocks have occurred, and 
in fact, the stocks of many species, such as the blue and humpback whales, harbor seals, and 
common dolphins are either stable or improving.32I Strandings of small cetaceans and California 
sea lions are common, usually attributed to fishery interaction, disease, or harmful algae 
314 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS-I; 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(a). 
315 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS-I. 
3161d. 
3171d. 
318 ld. at CRS-I-2 (citing Navy Invests in Protecting Marine Mammals, Story No. NN5071220-
22 (Dec. 20,2007». 
319 Navy's Acceptance, supra note 294, at 4 190. 
320ld. 
321 ld. The Eastern North Pacific gray whale stock increased and the species was removed from the 
Endangeredffhreatened Species List, but unfortunately is currently experiencing habitat changes due to ice melting 
patterns. 
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blooms.322 There have been several individual beaked whale strandings, and these also are 
usually caused by fishery interaction, or disease. 323 The cause of some of these strandings is 
unknown, but there has been no apparent link to MFA sonar. 324 
B. Winter v. NRDC Litigation History 
In order to understand the Navy's invocation of 40 c.F.R. § 1506.11, it is important to shift through the 
procedural history of the case and how it got to the Supreme Court. The issue of the Navy's use of sonar in 
training exercises and the impact on marine mammals has been brewing for years?25 Legal challenges to 
the use of low-frequency sonar were before the District Court for the Northern District of California, 
but were settled by the Navy in 200S?26 The challenges to the use of mid-frequency active [MFA] 
sonar were first heard in the District Court for the Central District of California. 327 The lead plaintiff in 
the MFA case was the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-govemmental environmental 
group, whose mission is "to safeguard the Earth - its people, plants and animals, and the natural systems on 
which life depends.,,328 Four other environmental groups, the Intemational Fund for Animal Welfare, the 
Cetacean Society Intemational, the League for Coastal Protection, and Ocean Futures Society were plaintiffs, 
as well as Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of famed oceanographer Jacques Cousteau. The defendants were 
the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the 




325 NRDC first sued the Navy over low-frequency active sonar in 2003. See NRDC v. Evans, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1083 
(N.D. Cal. 2003). However, NRDC claims that it first brought the issue of ocean noise to the public's awareness in 
1995. Reynolds, supra note 138, at 775. Also, NRDC sued the Navy in 1994 for "ship shock." NRDC v. U.S. Dept. 
of the Navy, 857 F. Supp. 734 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
326 NRDC v. Gutierrez, No. 07-4771-EDL (N.D. Cal. August 12,2008) (order approving the settlement agreement 
wherein the Navy agreed to limit low-frequency sonar training to certain areas of the Pacific Ocean, rather than the 
worldwide scope as originally planned). 
m NRDC v. Winter, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97385 (C.D. Cal. luI. 5, 2006). MFA sonar was 
also it issue in the District Court of Hawaii, in Ocean Mammal Institute v. Gates, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D.C. Haw. 
2008). 
328 See http://www.nrdc.org/aboutl. 
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(NOAA), and the Administmtor of NOAA.329 The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy had violated three 
laws: the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), and NEPA.330 
On August 6th, 2CJ.J7, the district court gmnted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to halt the 
eleven remaining Navy training exercises that were planned?3! The court agreed that the plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail on their claim" under the CZMA and NEP A, but held that the ESA claim wa" not likely to 
succeed?32 Since neither NEPA nor CZMA provides a right to sue, the court reviewed the claims 
brought under these statutes under the standard set by the Administrative Procedures Act -- whether the 
• ~..l..' d" 333 agency actIon was ill ultrJry an capnclOus:' . 
In February 2007, the Navy had prepared an EA under NEP A, and found that there were no significant 
adverse environment effects that would require preparing an EIS?34 It did conclude, however, that there 
could be, as a result of the training exercises, 170,000 "takes,,,335 mostly Level B harassment, of marine 
mammals, including 8000 "tem}X)rary threshold shifts" to marine mammals, and 466 permanent injuries to 
beaked or ziphiid whales, some of which are endangered?36 The district court said that plaintiffs had 
showed a probability of success in their claims that the Navy should have prepared an EIS after finding 
these effects, and that the Navy did not adequately review alternatives to its training plan?37 
329 Brieffor the Petitioners at II, Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2007) (No. 07-1239). 
330 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57909, *6 (CD. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). 
331 There were 14 total exercises in COMPTUEX and JTFEX. NRDC v. Winter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57909, *4 
(CD. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007). 
332 NRDC v. Winter, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97385 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2006). 
3335 U.S.C § 706(2). 
334 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 8-10. 
m "Take" under the Endangered Species Act, means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C § 1532(19). 
336 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57909, *4 (CD. Cal. 2007). 
3371d. at *2 I. The court also found that there was a likelihood that the Navy violated the CZMA According to the Navy, the 
MFA trdining was consistent with the state CMP because it would not affect California's coastal resources, and the Navy did not need 
to adopt the mitigation measures California deemed necessary. 1hc court suggested that the Navy's determination that its exercises 
would not harm coastal resources could be found arbitrary and capricious. 
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The court issued a preliminary injunction, halting the use of MFA sonar during the challenged 
COMPTUEX and JTFEX exercises planned in the Southern California range through January 2009.:138 
The Navy appealed, and on August 31, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Cowt of Appeals stayed the injunction, and 
ordered an expedited briefmg.339 Later, in November, after the briefing, the Ninth Circuit vacated the stay, 
enjoining again the Navy from conducting MFA exercises, and remanded the case to the district court to 
enter a modified preliminary injunction containing appropriate mitigating conditions?40 
On January 3, 2008, the district court again issued a preliminary injunction, containing seven 
specific mitigation measures.34I Those mea 'lures were: 
• a 12-nautical mile coastal exclusion zone; 
• a 2200-yard MFA sonar shut down: 
• monitoring; 
• use of helicopter dipping sonar; 
• a reduction of MFA sonar decibels when surface ducting conditions are found; 
• no MFA sonar use in Catalina basin, a "choke point" for animals; and 
• continued use of mitigation measures from the 2007 National Defense Exemption.342 
On January 9th, 2008, the Navy asked the district court to stay its decision pending appeal.343 The 
district court narrowed the mitigation measures and issued a modified preliminary injunction on January 
lOth,2008?44 That same day, on January 10th, 2008, the Navy asked CEQ for alternative arrangements to 
NEP A, under 40 c.F.R. § 1506.11, that would allow them to conduct the remaining training exercises 
3381d. at *34. 
339 NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2007). 
340 NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2007). 
341 NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 11 J 8-21 (CD. Cal. 2008). 
3421d. 
343 NRDC v. Winter, 513 F.3d 920, 92 J (9th Cir. 2008). 
3441d. 
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as scheduled, while an EIS was being completed.345 CEQ said the Navy indicated that two of the 
mitigation measures required by the district court would "create a significant and unreasonable risk that 
Strike Groups will not be able to train and be certified a~ fully mission capable.,,346 The then-Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, explained that "[t]he southern California operating area 
provides unique training opportunities that are vital to prepare our forces, and the planned exercises cannot 
be postponed without impacting national security.,,347 On January 15th, 2008, CEQ provided alternative 
arrangements that paralleled the 2007 National Defense Exemption mitigation mea~ures?48 
Also on January 15th, 2008, the President of the United States exempted the Navy exercises from 
compliance with the CZMA, using the authority under 16 u.s.c. § 1456(c)(l)(B)?49 The President 
determined that the use of MFA sonar in the exercises was "in the paramount interest of the United 
States ... " and the training and certification of carrier and expeditionary strike groups wa<; "essential to 
national security.,,350 
Because of these two exemptions, the Navy went back to the Ninth Circuit and asked it to vacate the 
injunction?51 The Ninth Circuit remanded the action to the district court on January 16,2008, for it to 
determine the effects of these developments on the preliminary injunction.352 
On February 4th, 2008, the district court held that the CEQ's action was beyond the scope of the 
regulation and was therefore invalid?53 It also held that when 40 c.F.R. § 1506.11 wa<; drafted, CEQ used 
the phrase "emergency circumstances" to refer to "sudden, unanticipated events, not the unfavorable 
345 Letter from James L. Connaughton, Chairman, CEQ, to Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy (Jan. 15,2008), at 3, 
available online at [http://georgebush-whitehouse.govlceql 
Letter _from_ Chairman_ Connaughton_to _Secretary _ WinteLpdf]. 
346 Id. 
347 News Release, Department of Defense, Navy Granted Authority To Use Sonar In Training 
Off California (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.millreleases/release.aspx '?releaseid= 11622. 
3481d. 
3491d. 
350 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1224 (CD. Cal. 2008). 
351 NRDC v. Winter, 513 F.3d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 2008). 
352 Id. at 922. 
353 NRDC, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1219. 
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consequences of protracted litigation. CEQ's contrary interpretation in this ca~ is 'plainly erroneous and 
inconsistent' with the regulation and, concomitantly, not entitled to deference.,,354 The court held that 
the Navy still had to comply with NEPA, and its injunction remained in place and the Navy could 
conduct MFA training only if it used the required mitigation measures. Wi The court stated that public 
interest was best served by requiring those mitigation measures, and this way the Navy would have the 
benefit of conducting training, and the natural resources would have limited harm from the training.356 The 
district court questioned the constitutionality of the President's CZMA exemption, but did not rule on it, 
satisfied that the injunction stocxl firmly on NEPA grounds.357 
The Navy sought to have the injunction stayed, since the next scheduled exercises were to begin in 
March, but the Ninth Circuit denied the request.358 Then on February 29th, 2008, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the Navy's appeal of the preliminary injunction.359 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that CEQ's interpretation of emergency circumstances was 
overly broad?60 The Ninth Circuit described the course of the litigation that ended in the injunction as 
"a series of events [that] gives rise to a predictable outcome, and not an unforeseeable one demanding 
unusual or immediate action.,,36t 
In a separate opinion, the Ninth Circuit modified two of the mitigation measures required by the district 
court, after the Navy argued that two of the measures would significantly limit its ability to conduct anti-
submarine training and jeopardize its ability to certify its strike groups as ready for deployment. 362 The Ninth 
Circuit allowed the 2,200-yard suspension to remain in place unless the training was at "a critical point in 
354Id. at 1229. 
355Id. at 1232. 
3561d. at 1239. 
357 Id. at 1237-38. 
358 NRDC v. Winter, 516 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). 
359 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 703 (9th Cir. 2008). 
360 ld. at 680. 
361 Id. at 682. 
362 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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the exercise," in which case the Navy would reduce the sonar by 6 decibels if a marine mammal was 
detected within 1 ,(xx) meters from the sonar source, reduce by 10 decibels if within 500 meters, and 
suspend the activity if within 200 meters of the sonar source.363 The second modification was for when 
significant surface ducting conditions were detected?64 Rather than shutting down the training, the Ninth 
Circuit required the Navy to similarly reduce and suspend the decibels of the activity?65 Therefore, the Navy 
could conduct it" training exercises, provided it used the new mitigation measures indicated by the court, 
along with the other undisputed measures. 
The Navy petitioned for write of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth 
Circuit decision?66 and the Supreme Court agreed to review the clairm?67 The Navy raised two issues: 
whether the CEQ permissibly construed its own regulation in finding emergency circumstances, and 
whether the injunction based on NEP A violations was appropriate?68 The injunction argument disputed 
whether the court adequately balanced the public interest in protecting marine mammals in gnll1ting the 
injunction against the public interest in national defense if the Navy training program were modified?69 
As far as the first issue, regarding the CEQ's fmding that an emergency circumstance did exist, the 
petitioners argued that not only are CEQ's regulations are entitled to substantial deference, 370 CEQ's 
interpretation of the term "emergency circumstance" in that regulation must be given '" controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation' itself.,,371 Accordingly to petitioners, and 
3631d. at 705-06. 
364 [d. at 706. 
365 Id. at 706. 
366 Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07 -1239). 
367 Winter v. NRDC, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008). 
368 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329 at 1. 
369 Id. 
370 [d. at 22 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,355-56 (1989». 
371 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 23 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala. 512 US 504, 512 
(1994». 
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strongly contested by respondents in lower court proceedings,372 the defmition of "emergency" does not 
just mean unexpected or unforeseen - it is an urgent circumstance demanding prompt action?73 
... [A]n 'emergency situation' exist<; when an immediate response is needed to avert a 
significant impending hann to the public interest, and for that reason, '[a]n assessment of 
blame regarding [the cause] of the predicament .. .is quite frankly irrelevant to a 
determination of whether [the government] is faced with an 'emergency situation.' 374 
Respondents contended otherwise in earlier proceedings, arguing that "emergency" requires the event to 
be unexpected, and in this case, the Navy knew since 2006 when the exercises were being planned that it 
would need to do an EIS.375 An example that petitioners used to show common use is if a cardiac patient 
does not take his heart medication, and goes into cardiac arrest; the resulting medical crisis is no less an 
"emergency" requiring immediate attention simply by the fact that it was foreseen?76 Or for that fact, 
because the patient may have contributed to its cause?77 Certainly ca<;e law is full of examples of 
anticipated emergencies, such as an air traffic controllers' strike?78 Moreover, previous ca<;es dealing with 
372 Respondents' brief in reply to the petition did not argue the definition of "emergency" but instead argued that 
CEQ did not have the authority to re-determine a factual issue made by the district court. Brief for the Respondents 
at 19, Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239). 
373 Brieffor the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 24. See e.g. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 407 (1984) (def. 2: "an urgent need for assistance or relief'); The Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 636 (2d ed. 1987) ("A situation demanding immediate action," which is "usually unexpected;" 
"exigency"); Black's Law Dictionary 522-23 (6th ed. 1990) (listing mUltiple definitions, including "perplexing 
contingency or complication of circumstances," "exigency" and "pressing necessity"); see also, e.g. The Oxford 
American Dictionary and Language Guide 313 (1999) ("a sudden state of danger, conflict, etc., requiring immediate 
action"); The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language 321 (1971) ("A sudden, usu. 
unexpected, occasion or combination of events calling for immediate action."); Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary of the English Language 741 (1967) (def. lc: "a usu. distressing event or condition that can often be 
anticipated or prepared for but seldom exactly foreseen."). 
374 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 26 (quoting Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 
866 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1077 (1989». 
375 In lower court opinions, Respondents also argued that the case did not turn on the definition of "emergency" 
because there was no urgent need since the District Court found that the Navy could train and certify its Strike 
Groups. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 372, at 22. 
376 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 25. 
mid. 
3781d. (citing Letenyei v. Dept of Transp., 735 F.2d 528, 531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1984); United 
Steelworkers v. United States, 372 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curium); 29 U.S.c. §§ 176, 178). 
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40 c.F.R. § 1506.11 support the view that "emergency" can mean a situation requiting an urgent need for 
action, even if the situation is of the requesting agency's own making.379 
In this case, petitioners argued that the emergency was the district court's order demanding an EIS 
before vital military exercises could effectively proceed?80 The Navy's need to carry out it~ mission in the 
wake of the President, its Commander-in-Chiefs conclusion that it is critically important to the country's 
security constituted a genuine emergency?8! Therefore, the petitioners argued, the Ninth Circuit erred 
when it deferred to the district court's reading of the regulation and what constitutes an "emergency," even 
after the court recognized that it can mean something requiring immediate attention?82 A~ petitioners 
pointed out, the Navy completed a robust EA, and concluded in good faith that an EIS was not necessary 
for the exercises to occur prior to completion of an EIS, which wa~ expected in January 2009?83 Even 
though the district court found that the Navy's conclusions were likely wrong, it was very reasonable for 
the Navy to believe its conclusion was correct.384 No emergency arose until the court ruled otherwise, and 
imposed an injunction jeopardizing the Navy's ability to train strike groups for deployment. 385 
During oral arguments, Justice Souter posed the question of whether the "emergency" was of the 
Navy's own making, by its failure to take timely action to do an EIS back when it decided to do the 
exercises, and therefore CEQ's emergency exception did not apply?86 The answer both by the 
government and by Justice Scalia was that the Navy did comply with NEPA in good faith by doing an EA 
before the exercises began?87 This was not an emergency because the Navy failed to do an EIS; it wa~ an 
379 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 30-31 (citing Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Valley Citizens for Safe Env. v. Vest, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21862 (D. Mass. 1991)). 
380 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 25. 
381 Jd. at 26. 
3821d. at 27. 
m ld. at 32. 
38-1ld. at 32 (citing U.S. Postal Service v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1,10 (2001». 
385 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 32. 
386 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239). 
387 ld. at 20. 
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emergency because contrary to the fact that that it complied with NEP A by doing in EA, it was now being 
stopped by the district court and Ninth Circuit from conducting the exercises in a way that would properly 
train its sailors. Failure to train and certify the Strike Group is an emergency?88 
Furthermore, the petitioners argued, even if the court does not grant the customary deference to 
CEQ's interpretation of its own regulation, it should be particularly reluctant to disregard the President's 
determination concerning the urgency of these training exercises.389 In fact, during oral arguments before 
the Supreme Court, Justice Alito asked Mr. Richard B. Kendall, NROC's attorney, "[i]sn't there 
something incredibly odd about a single district judge making a determination on that defense question 
[whether the injunction will permit the Navy to train and certify its sailors] that is contrary to the 
determination that the Navy has made?,,39o 
Besides the disagreement over the proper defInition of "emergency," the respondents argued that 
because CEQ merely rubber-stamped the Navy's position when it granted the alternative arrangements, its 
decision was not entitled to deference?91 They also thought that CEQ's decision was especially defIcient 
in light of the fact that it has no expertise regarding naval training?92 Interesting, though, that in the 
respondents' opinion, the district court could determine what level of training is sufficient. 
388 For a non-sonar example of why repeated training in real-world scenarios is vital to the Navy, 
see the JAGMAN Command Investigation into the Fire that Occurred Onboard USS GEORGE 
WASHINGTON (CVN-73) on 22 May 2008 (July 1,2008), available at 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil!contentifoiaiwashingtonIFOIA_ GW _Fire _investigation. pdf. 
389 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 329, at 26. 
390 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239). Mr. Kendall's answer was "no." 
391 Brieffor the Respondents, supra note 372, at 32-33 (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 
U.S. 156, 167(1962». 
392 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 372, at 32 (citing Adams Fruit Co., v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990) 
(no deference owed to agency acting outside its expertise». 
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C. Supreme Court Ruling 
1. Majority's A voidance of the Emergency Exception Issue 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, reversed the Ninth Circuit and vacated the injunction to the 
extent that the Navy had challenged it.393 Chief Justice Roberts wa<; joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, and Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part and wa<; joined by Justice 
Stevens?94 Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion,joined by Justice Souter.395 The majority 
decided the case solely on the second issue, whether the preliminary injunction was appropriate, and 
decided it was not.396 The Court focused primarily on the competing interests - NRDC's "ecological, 
scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals,,397 versus "the Navy's need to conduct realistic 
trdining exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines,,398 and held 
that the Navy's interest "plainly outweighed" NRDC' s?99 
2. Dissent's Opinion of No Emergency Exception 
While the majority steered clear of the issue of whether CEQ had properly granted alternative 
arrangements to the Navy under 4D c.F.R. § 1506.11, the dissent spent the majority of its opinion on it, as 
well as the purpose behind NEPA.4OO If the Navy had followed NEPA and completed the EIS before 
taking action, the dissent argues, both the parties and the public would have benefited from the 
environmental analysis, and the Navy could have proceeded with its training without interruption.401 
"Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus thwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve.,,402 The 
Navy, in an attempt to justify its actions, sought dispensation not from Congress, but from the CEQ, an 
393 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 370 (2008). 
3941d. at 369. 
3951d. 




400 Id. at 382-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
401 Id. at 387. 
402 ld. 
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executi ve council that lacks authority to countermand or revise NEP A's requirement'>, the dissent 
continues.403 These actions both undermined NEPA and took "an extraordinary course.,,404 Had the Navy 
done a legally sufficient EIS before beginning the exercises, NEPA would have function how it was 
intended to: the EIS process, including the public input, might have convinced the Navy to voluntarily 
adopt mitigation measures, and it'> training would not have been impeded.405 
The dissent also agreed with one of respondent's many arguments a'> to why CEQ's decision was 
conclusory and insufficient to set a'>ide the district court's findings and injunction -- the fact that the Navy 
submitted material to CEQ that supported only its side, and that neither the Navy nor CEQ ever notified 
NRDC about the request for alternative aIrdllgement<;.406 "CEQ's ha'>ty decision on a one-sided record is 
no substitute for the District Court's considered judgment based on a two-sided record.,,407 
Regardless, even if CEQ's review had been exemplary, the dissent felt that CEQ lacked authority to 
absolve an agency of its duty under NEPA to prepare an EIS.408 This is a more fundamental problem than 
just the fact that the alternative arrangements that CEQ granted did not vindicate NEPA's objectives.409 
CEQ was established by NEPA to assist and advise the President on environmental policy,410 and an 
Executive Order charged CEQ with issuing regulations for implementation of NEP A's procedural 
provisions.411 The dissent then argues that although 40 CFR § 1506.11 "indicates that CEQ may play an 
important consultative role in emergency circumstances, ... [the Supreme Court has] never suggested that 
CEQ could eliminate the statute's command.'.412 
4031d. 
404 Id. at 389. 
405 Id. at 390. 
406 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 372, at 22. 
407 Id. at 391. 
408 Id. 
409 Id. 
410 Id.; 42 U.s.c. § 4342. 
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The dissent also points out that the Navy had other options, including requesting assistance from 
Congress, and obtained authorization to proceed with planned activities without fulfilling NEPA's 
requirements.413 '''The Navy's alternative course - rapid, self-serving report to an office in the White 
House - is surely not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with NEP A 'to the 
fullest extent possible.",414 
While the dissent makes an impassioned argument that the Navy has illegally by-pa<;sed NEP A, it 
ignores the fact that the Navy did prepare an EA before the exercises. It consulted with other agencies. 
The EA was submitted to the public. Not every federal action requires an E1S, and by going the EA route, 
the Navy did not contravene the "informational and participatory pUrpose,,415 behind NEP A. 
D. Present Status of MFA 
MFA sonar use by the Navy is not going to go away, and will likely be challenged at 
every turn. Several key congressional lawmakers have recently called on the National 
Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to strengthen the mitigation measures 
that the Navy must comply with when using MFA.416 "The review, while focused on East Coast 
and Gulf of Mexico sonar activities, is considered by environmentalists to be precedent-setting 
for how sonar will be addressed at the various ranges off other coasts as well. 'I think it's a 
watershed' for the sonar issue, one environmentalist says.,,417 Earlier this year, CEQ asked 
NOAA to reexamine the mitigation measures for the Navy's Atlantic Fleet Active Sonar 
413 ld. at 390 (citing Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2001, Pub. L. 106-398, § 
317,114 Stat. 1654a-57 (exempting the military from preparing a programmatic EIS for low-level flight training); 
42 U.S.c. § 10141(c) (2009) (exempting EPA from preparing an EIS for the development of criteria for handling 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste); 43 U.S.c. § 1652(d) (2009) (exempting construction of the 
trans-Alaska oil pipeline from further NEPA compliance». 
414 NRDC, 129 S. Ct. at 391, citing 42 U.S.c. § 4332. 
m NRDC, 129 S. Ct. at 390. 
416 Senators Pressure NOAA to Tighten Mitigation on Navy Sonar, 17 DEF. ENVTL ALERT, Aug. 4, 2009. 
417 Id .. 
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Training (AFAST) area, which is the largest of a series of training ranges for which the Navy has 
asked for take authorizations related to sonar use.418 
Just recently, on July 31, 2009, the Navy issued its Record of Decision for the 
construction of an undersea warfare training range (USWTR), a 500-square nautical mile 
shallow-water range off the coast of Florida, used for anti-submarine warfare training.419 
Concerns about the use of MFA sonar and impact on marine wildlife were raised at the public 
scoping meetings and during the public comment periods.420 Since the publication of the Record 
of Decision, environmental groups are reported to be contemplating litigation.421 
"Environmentalists say the Navy's final environmental impact statement on the development 
fails to adequately address environmental impacts, particularly to the right whale.,,422 Even the 
Environmental Protection Agency has expressed concern about marine impacts in the 
construction and operation of USWTR.423 
Perhaps following the environmentalist's focus on USWTR, will be the Gulf of Mexico 
(GOMEX) Range Complex. The GOMEX Range Complex is a combination of both sea and 
airspace where the Navy and the Marine Corps conduct training, including use of MFA sonar.424 
The Navy is currently preparing an EIS.425 
418 1d. 
419 See http;//projects.earthtech.com/uswtrIUSWTR_index.htm for website containing the OEISIEIS and other 
information about USWTR. 
HO USWTR OEISIEIS, pg 7-2, 7-5, 7-8, 7-13. See also Worries Over Navy Sonar at Whale Bil1hing Area. Georgia. 
Florida state agencies Among Those Concerned, AP, Mar. 13. 2009, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/idI29678135/ . 
.J2I Senators Pressure NOAA fo Tighten Mitigation 011 Navy Sonar, 17 DEF. ENVTL ALERT. Aug. 4, 2009. 
422 Id. 
423 Hind Sabir, EPA Expresses Concern About Motorized Travel, Undersea WCllfare Training, TARGETED NEWS 
SERV., Aug. 7,2009. 
m See http://www.gomexrangecomplexeis.com/RangeSustainability.aspx. 
425 See http://www.gomexrangecomplexeis.comlEIS.aspx#background. 
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V. Factors That Could Impact the Potential Success of the Emergency Exception 
Critics argue that CEQ is not authorized to create a NEPA exception, only Congress is. 
They point to the fact that when Congress has seen an emergency, it acted to create specific 
agencies. Courts then have excused these agencies from complying with NEPA because of 
Congress' determination of the exigent circumstances of the emergency. The inference is that 
when Congress intends an emergency exception from NEPA, it will affirmatively create one. 426 
While an agency's interpretation of its regulations is ordinarily entitled to substantial 
deference by reviewing courts,427 "where an agency's interpretation defies the plain meaning of a 
regulation, courts have rejected the agency's interpretation.,,428 Until the Winter v. NRDC case, 
that had not happened before in the context of the emergency exemption.429 
The criticisms of section 1506.11 boil down to three arguments: 1) CEQ exceed the scope 
of authority granted to it by Executive Order No. 11991, and therefore section 1506.11 is ultra 
vires; 2) the lack of definition of the term "emergency" may lead to more expansive 
interpretations; and 3) the fear of the possibility that courts may grant a high degree of deference 
to CEQ's determination.43o Although all three arguments have at least some merit, only the 
second criticism will be explored more fully below. Of note is the fact that only the ultra vires 
argument was raised by the respondents in Winter v. NRDC. 
A. Lack of a Bright-Line Test 
In the law, nothing is better than a bright-line test. A bright line test is where the result is 
objectively rather than subjectively determined; where the presence or absence of a particular 
426 Orsi, supra note 34, at 496. See example in Cohen v. Price Commission, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
427 See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301. 
1309-1310 (1974). 
m See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994). 
429 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS-I O. 
4}O Orsi, supra note 34. 
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factor or factors determines the outcome.431 However, when it comes to what constitutes an 
emergency under 40 c.F.R. § 1506.11, there is no such test. Nor has any court that has dealt 
with the emergency exception to NEPA articulated a bright-line test. The Supreme Court in 
Winter v. NRDC had the opportunity to speak to this issue, and yet chose not to, deciding the 
case instead on the balancing of interests prong of the test for appropriateness of an injunction. 
In the context of military action, though, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts felt 
that the decision to call the crisis in the Middle East in the early 1990's, even after the Gulf War 
had concluded, an emergency was not arbitrary and capricious. The current world situation is 
not much different, and perhaps even more dangerous, with new enemies cropping up. The 
military'S need to train given these situations is a given, and therefore the prevention of such 
training is certainly an emergency. 
B. Using Other Statutes 
a. Definition of "Emergency" in the Environmental Arena 
Because "emergency" is not defined in NEPA or CEQ's regulations, it is illustrative to 
look at other environmental statutes to see how they handle emergency situations. Under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, the EPA Administrator may, at his or her 
discretion, exempt any federal or state agency from compliance with FIFRA if he or she 
determines that emergency conditions exist.432 The Act does not define "emergency," but does 
say that the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce and the Governor of the 
state concerned when determining whether emergency conditions exist.433 Furthermore, the 
regulations implementing FIFRA say that there are four types of authorized emergency 
431 THE LAW DICTIONARY, 2002, available at LEXIS. 
432 7 U.S.c. § 136p (2009). 
m 7 U.S.c. § 136p. 
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exemptions: specific, quarantine, public health, and crisis exemption.434 Crisis exemption is one 
that may be used in an emergency condition when the time from the discovery of the emergency 
to the time when the pesticide use is needed is not long enough to allow for the authorization of a 
specific, quarantine, or public health exemption.435 
The Wilderness Act allows for road building in the wilderness, otherwise prohibited, 
during "personal health and safety emergencies.,,436 It appears to narrow "emergencies," a 
proposition that is aided by a different provision that says that certain measures may be taken as 
may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, and diseases.437 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides a NEP A 
exemption for immediate response actions.438 For disasters and emergency relief actions abroad, 
Executive Order 12,114 allows for exemptions from environmental review requirements.439 
The only federal environmental law that actually defines "emergency" is the Marine 
Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, otherwise known as the Ocean Dumping Act, which 
allows for dumping of industrial waste in emergencies,44o and permits vessels to scuttle cargo 
and waste during emergencies.441 Section 1412a states, "[a]s used herein, 'emergency' refers to 
situations requiring actions with a marked degree of urgency." This definition is precisely the 
argument used by the Navy in Winter v. NRDC. The Navy did not cite to the MPRSA, though. 
b. "Emergency" vs. National Security Interests 
While some environmental laws have emergency exceptions, a far greater number have 
national security exceptions. It can be argued that national security interests are a particular type 
m 40 C.F.R. § 166.2 and (d). 
435 40 C.F.R. § 166.2 and (d). 
m 16 U.S.c. § 1133(c) (2009). 
m 16 U.S.c. § 1133(d)(l). 
438 42 U.S.c. § 5159. 
439 Exec. Order 12,114, § 2-5,44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4,1979). 
440 33 U.S.c. § 1412a (2009). 
441 40 C.F.R. § 220. 
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of emergency, and of course, not every emergency is a national security interest. But is every 
national security situation an emergency? 
Conflicts certainly exist between the requirements of environmental laws and the 
protection of national security, although there are some who believe that such conflicts are 
avoidable with proper planning and foresight. 442 The military understands this conflict only too 
well. As RADM Robert T. Moeller, Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, Plans and Policy, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, stated in 2003, 
[w]e face numerous challenges and adversaries that threaten our way of life. The 
President has directed us to 'be ready' to face this challenge. To fulfill this 
directive, we must conduct comprehensive and realistic combat training-
providing our sailors with the experience and proficiency to carry out their 
missions. This requires appropriate use of our training ranges and operating area 
and testing weapon systems. The Navy has demonstrated stewardship of our 
natural resources. We will continue to promote the health of lands entrusted to 
our care. We recognize the responsibility to the nation in both these areas and 
k . . b I . h . 443 see your aSSIstance m a ancmg t ese ... reqUIrements. ' 
Although NEP A does not have a specific national security exemption from its 
requirement to prepare an environmental review of major federal actions significantly affecting 
the environment, the Act does contain language that could be viewed as allowing federal 
agencies sufficient flexibility to prevent it from being showstopper to national security goals.444 
As an example, NEP A section 4331 (b) provides that the government shall "use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy" and section 4332 only 
442 Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 
25 VA. ENVTL LJ. 105, 108 (2007) (citing STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 185 
(1996) (declaring that "with rare exceptions, we can maintain a strong effective defense without endangering the 
public health or destroying our national resources."». 
443 ld. at 108, n. 8 (quoting Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative: Testimony Before the Comm. On House 
Resources, 108!h Congo (2003) (statement of RADM Moeller), quoted in Natalie Barefoot-Watamba, Comment, Who 
is Encroaching Whom? The Balance Between our Naval Security Needs and the Environment: The 2004 RRPI 
Provisions as a Response to Encroachment Concerns, 59 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 577, 598 (2005). 
444Id. at 115. 
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requires that a federal agency conduct environmental reviews "to the fullest extent possible.,,445 
Courts have generally been protective of the military, when faced with a conflict between NEPA 
mandates and military needs.446 However, critics are quick to point out that "[t]o the military, 
training and operations are on-going needs - not an emergency exception,,,447 an argument that 
certainly cuts against the Navy's position in Winter v. NRDC. 
Other environmental statutes have specific exemptions for military action, and the lack of 
one in NEPA could be interpreted to mean that Congress intended it that way, intending the 
military to comply fully with NEPA under all circumstances. Conversely, the fact that Congress 
has seen 41 instances of CEQ granting alternative arrangements under the emergency exception, 
nine of which going to the Department of Defense, and have not taken legislative action could 
mean their acquiescence. 
These exemptions to federal environmental laws that Congress has granted provide 
authority for suspending compliance requirements for actions at federal facilities on a case-by-
case basis.448 Some are specific to military installations, rather than all federal facilities. 449 Most 
of the exemptions can only be granted by the President, and not the head of the agency or 
department.450 Most are for activities that are in the "paramount interest of the United States" 
and some are specific to national security or national defense. 451 Of note, none of the 
4451d. See also Willard et aI., supra note I 18, at 8 I. 
446 Babcock, supra note 442, at 115 (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw.lPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 
139 (1981) (refusing to require the Navy to prepare a hypothetical EIS before completing facilities capable of 
storing nuclear weapons, saying that an EIS would not be required unless the Navy actually stored the nuclear 
weapons at the facilities, even though the Navy, for national security reasons. could neither admit or deny that it 
prosed to store nuclear weapons there)). 
447!d. at I 17 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 85.1708). 





exemptions contain criteria for determining whether an activity meets the applicable threshold. 452 
The President or other authorized decision-maker has the discretion to make this determination, 
depending on the statute.453 
The Department of Defense's position is that obtaining exemptions on a case-by-case 
basis is onerous due to the large number of training exercises routinely conducted on hundreds of 
military installations.454 A separate argument is that the time limits placed on most exemptions, 
which generally are one or two years, are incompatible with ongoing or recurring training 
activities.455 
Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, maritime military actions may be exempted if 
the Secretary of Defense, after conferring with the Secretary of Commerce, determines that the 
action is necessary for national defense.456 The exemption is good for up to two years, and 
additional exemption periods are allowed. The MMPA also has other accommodations for 
military actions - it has a different definition of "harassment" when the action is part of military 
readiness activities, which effectively means that more harm is required before it rises to the 
statutory level of harassment. Finally, under the MMPA' s "incidental take permits" provisions, 
for the Department of Defense, the factors considered in determining the "least practical adverse 
impact" include personnel safety, practicality of implementation, and impact on the effectives of 
h ., 457 t e actIvity. -
While not particular to the military, the Coastal Zone Management Act has an exemption 
for compliance with a state Coastal Management Program if the action is in the paramount 
4521d. at CRS-2. 
mid. 
-I5-1 ld. 
455 ld .. However, most time periods can be renewed. 
456 P.L. 108-136, § 319(t), 117 Stat. 1434. 
-157 16 U.s.c. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2009). 
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interest of the United States.458 However, this determination must be made by the President, not 
the head of the federal agency, and is not available until after a court has ruled against the 
agency.459 
The President, if he finds that it is necessary in the interest of national defense or security, 
can waive compliance with the Toxic Substance Control Act,460 the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),461 and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.462 The Noise Control Act allows exemptions for 
reasons of national security.463 The Endangered Species Act states that the Committee shall 
grant an exemption from prohibited takes for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds 
that is necessary for reasons of national security.464 Provisions in the Clear Air Act allow for 
some exemptions in the interest of national securit/65 or if it is in the paramount interest of the 
United States.466 The President can grant relief to federal agencies from the requirements of the 
458 16 U.S.c. § 1456(c) (2009). 
459 CRS Report, supra note 3, at CRS-5. 
460 15 U.S.c. § 2621 (2009) ("The Administrator shall waive compliance with any provision in this chapter upon a 
request and detennination by the President that the requested waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense." 
461 42 U.S.c. § 9620(j) (2009) ("The President may issue such orders regarding response actions at any specified site 
or facility of the Department of Energy or the Department of Defense as may be necessary to protection the national 
security interests of the United States at that site or facility."). 
462 42 U.S.c. §§ 1100-11050 (2009), and Exec. Order No. 13,148, 65 Fed. Reg 24,595 (April 26, 2000), which 
applies EPCRA to federal agencies ("Subject to Subsection 902(c) of this order and except as otherwise required by 
applicable law, in the interest of national security, the head of an agency may request from the President an 
exemption from complying with the provisions of any or all provisions of this order for particular agency 
facilities .... "). 
463 42 U.S.c. § 4909(b)(l) (2009). 
464 16 USc. § 1536U) (2009). The ESA also contains a provision allowing for exemptions in presidentially 
declared disaster areas. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(p) (2009). 
465 42 U.S.c. § 7412(i)(4) (2009) ("The President may exempt any stationary source from compliance with any 
standard or limitation under this section for a period of not more than two years if the President determines that the 
technology to implement such standard is not available and that it is in the national security interests of the United 
States to do so."). 
466 42 U.S.c. § 7418(b) (2009) (The President may exempt any emission source of any department, agency, or 
instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the 
paramount interest of the United States to do so .... In addition to any such exemption ... , the President may, if he 
determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so, issue regulations exempting from 
compliance ... any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vehicles or other classes or categories of property which are owned 
or operated by the Armed Forces of the United States (including Coast Guard) or by the National Guard of any state 
and which are uniquely military in nature."). 
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Safe Drinking Water Act when it would be in the paramount interests of national defense,467 
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the President can determine it to 
be in the paramount interest of the country to exempt any federal solid waste management 
f 'I' 468 d d k 469 f I' aCl lty or un ergroun storage tan s rom comp lance, 
The Clean Water Act has act of God and act of war exemptions,47o and defines "act of 
God" as meaning an act "occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural disaster.,,471 Similarly, 
CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act have acts of God/acts of war defenses,472 The National 
Historic Protection Act allows for disaster waivers, as well as for national security threats, 473 
Executive Order 12,114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, 
besides the disaster exemption, also contains an exemption for "actions taken by or pursuant to 
the direction of the President or Cabinet officer when the national security or interest is involved 
or when the action occurs in the course of an armed conflict.,,474 
The Administrative Procedure Act has a semblance of a national security exemption,475 
Section 701 (b)( 1 )(G) excludes from the definition of "agency" any "military authority exercised 
in the field in the time of war or in occupied territory," However, courts have narrowly 
interpreted this provision,476 "Although they are loath to interfere in command relationships477 or 
467 42 U,S.c. § 300h-7(h) (2009). 
468 42 U.s.c. § 6961(a) (2009). 
469 42 U.S.c. § 699 Jf(a). Similar provisions apply to treatment, storage and disposal facilities. 
40 C.F.R. § 264.1 (g)(8). 
470 33 U.S.c. § 1321(f) (2009). 
471 33 U.S.c. § 1321(a)(I2). 
m 42 U.S.c. § 9607(b)(1); 33 U.s.c. § 2703(a). 
473 16 U.S.c. § 470h-2(j) (2009) (The Secretary shall promulgate regulations under which the requirements of this 
section may be waived in whole or in part in the even of a major natural disaster or an imminent threat to national 
security). 
m Exec. Order No. 12,114, § 2-5(iii), 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979). 
475 Willard et aI., supra note 118, at 80. 
4761d. 
m See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
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the military's decisions on training and equipping,478 they have not given military departments 
much deference when it comes to application of other statutory schemes.,,479 
VII. Conclusion 
The fight over the Navy's use of sonar and its potential affect on marine mammals is 
certainly not over. The Navy, as well as all military branches, follows the requirements of 
NEPA and CEQ's regulations to the best of its ability, the vast majority of the time. It does not 
make decisions about the environmental impacts of its actions, be they training, or the movement 
of an aircraft carrier to a new homeport,480 in a vacuum. Agencies such as the EPA, the U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Service, NOAA, and the National Marine Fisheries Service are all consulted and 
they weigh in on the impacts. And yet, the military faces opposition and the threat of lawsuits 
and injunctions at every turn. 
While the Navy did nothing wrong in the preparation of an Environmental Assessment 
during the events challenged in Winter v. NRDC, hopefully the lesson learned is to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement sufficiently ahead of time, thus not necessitating the need for 
40 c.F.R. § 1506.11 and its emergency exception. For the Navy should not pin its hopes on a 
court's interpretation of "emergency," even though some case law and other environmental 
statutes support the Navy's broad definition in Winter v. NRDC. Moreover, the arguments 
against section 1506.11' s legality have some merit; not only could a court decide that the 
situation does not merit an "emergency" status, but could find the whole section unconstitutional. 
478 See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I (1973). 
479 Willard et aI., supra note liS, at SO (citing Doe v. Sullivan, 93S F .2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that 
plaintiffs challenge to a Health and Human Services rulemaking allowing military to use unapproved, 
investigational drugs was outside the military authority exception». 
480 See 62 Fed. Reg. 44,954 (Aug. 25, 1997) for the Record of Decision for Facilities Development Necessary to 
Support the Homeporting of a Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier at the Naval Station, Mayport, Florida. 
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A better course of action instead, would be for NEP A to contain a national security 
exemption, like other environmental laws do. In the statute itself, rather than in CEQ's 
regulations lends credibility to its legality, and shows congressional intent. Furthermore, the new 
exemption should provide that only the President could exempt federal action, not CEQ or EPA, 
much less the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaries of the various military departments. This 
way there is uniformity, as well as some sort of checks and balances. 
"Train as we fight" is not just a phrase in the Navy and other services; it is a statement of 
the absolute necessity for realistic training and for preparing service members for the conditions 
in which they may find themselves. It is training to prepare for the national defense of us all. 
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